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In warfare during the Middle Ages, a “mine” was a tunnel dug to bring down castles 
and other fortifications. The technique was used when the fortification was not built 
on solid rock, and was developed as a response to stone built castles that could not 
be burned like earlier-style wooden forts. A tunnel would be excavated under the 
outer defenses either to provide access into the fortification or to collapse the walls.  
These tunnels would normally be supported by temporary wooden props as the 
digging progressed. Once the excavation was complete, the wall or tower being 
undermined would be collapsed by filling the excavation with combustible material 
that, when lit, would burn away the props leaving the structure above unsupported 
and thus liable to collapse.1 
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Executive Summary 
As we approach the 2008 general election, the structure of elections in the United States — once 
reliant on local representatives accountable to the public — has become almost wholly 
dependent on large corporations, which are not accountable to the public. Most local officials 
charged with running elections are now unable to administer elections without the equipment, 
services, and trade-secret software of a small number of corporations.2  
If the vendors withdrew their support for elections now, our election structure would collapse.  
However, some states and localities are recognizing the threat that vendor-dependency poses to 
elections. They are using ingenuity and determination to begin reversing the direction.  
This report examines the situation, how we got here, and steps we can take to limit corporate 
control of our elections in 2008 and reduce it even further in the future.  
Case studies presented in this report give examples of the pervasive control voting system 
vendors now have over election administration in almost every state, and the consequences 
some jurisdictions are already experiencing. Such dependency has allowed vendors to:  
♦ Coerce election officials into risk-riddled agreements, as occurred in Angelina County, 
Texas in May 2008.  
♦ Endanger election officials’ ability to comply with federal court orders, as occurred in 
Nassau County, New York in July 2008.  
♦ Escape criminal penalties for knowingly violating state laws and causing election debacles, 
as occurred in San Diego, California in 2004.  
Analysis of the impact of laws and decisions at all levels of government demonstrates that 
lawmakers and officials have facilitated the dependence of local elections on private 
corporations. This report explores: 
♦ How the mandates of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) and the inaction of the 
federal government left the states and localities with nowhere to turn but to the vendors.  
♦ How state laws, passed by ill-informed representatives, limited the options of local officials 
to the voting systems developed by big corporations. 
Voting system vendors’ contracts, communications, and histories explored in this report reveal 
that vendors exploit the local jurisdictions’ dependency by charging exorbitant fees, violating 
laws and ethics, exerting proprietary control over the machinery of elections, and disclaiming 
unaccountability.  
However, even in the current vendor-dependent environment, some jurisdictions are resisting 
vendor control and finding ways to decrease their dependency and build an independent 
foundation for their election structure. See page 40 for case studies that point to the power state 
and local election officials have to reclaim control of elections.  
♦ More than many local election officials realize, they have the legal authority to oversee 
vendors and limit vendor dependency, as is occurring in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.  
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Election Systems (formerly Diebold), though a few other corporations have a very small share of the market. 
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♦ States can “kick the vendor out of the state” or at least stop further vendor infiltration into 
their elections by following the lead of Oklahoma and Oregon.  
♦ Paper ballots allow local officials, like those in Curry County, New Mexico, to ultimately 
rely on their own devices and their own citizens, rather than on the high-tech devices sold 
by vendors. In the words of the deputy county clerk: 
“If necessary, we can always hand count them.”  
The final section of this report recommends practical, concrete actions for reducing vendor 
dependence. Even in time for the November 2008 general election, local officials and citizens 
can take positive steps to oversee the vendors’ goods and services and mitigate vendor control.  
Citizens — both private and public — are beginning to realize that they can and must re-assert 
their ownership of elections and demand transparent citizen oversight of elections.  
 
“The core mechanics of the American election process should rest with the people 
charged with administering elections; it should never be wholesaled to election-system 
vendors.” 
~ Leonard Piazza, Election Director, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania 
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About This Report 
Method of Study 
The case studies and incidents described in this report are only a handful of hundreds of similar 
incidents that tell the same story. The author presented the incidents in this report, not as a 
comprehensive study, but merely as examples of the state of our election structure as we 
approach the 2008 general election.  
This report is based on information from the following sources:  
♦ The federal Help America Vote Act of 2002, enacted on October 29, 2002. 
♦ Reports from the federal Election Assistance Commission to Congress.  
♦ Studies conducted by government officials, consultants, and individual researchers. 
♦ Interviews with state and local election officials.  
♦ Transcripts of county commissioners’ meetings. 
♦ Contracts between local jurisdictions and their voting system vendors.  
♦ Voting system certification documents. 
♦ Five years of media reports of election-related incidents from across the country. 
♦ Public records received through open records requests.  
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Introduction 
Historically, the structure of elections in the United States has been grounded in the work of 
thousands of local officials, representing and accountable to hundreds of thousands of voters. 
This was not a rigid and fixed foundation, but a solid support formed by the involvement of a 
multitude of citizens, each during their own time in history holding up their own small part — 
some with integrity, some corrupt, some efficient, some incompetent, some responsible, some 
complacent. Overall, U.S. elections were built on the solid ground of the vast breadth and 
diversity of the people who held and upheld them.  
That is no longer the case.  
Voting system vendors3 have undermined that broad, diverse foundation and replaced it with 
their own costly support. They promise speedy results to time-sensitive broadcast media; relief 
to burdened election administrators; assistance to voters; progress to those enamored of high-
tech; and fraud-proof elections to those who would buy their products. 
But study after study shows their 
products to be seriously flawed. 
Their products and services often 
cause election problems for which 
they disclaim accountability. And 
cash-strapped localities struggle to 
pay the vendors’ unexpectedly high 
maintenance and support fees.  
Our dependence on vendor support 
has left our election structure 
vulnerable to corporate decisions 
that are not in the public interest, 
corporate profiteering, and claims 
of trade-secrecy for information that 
is essential to public oversight of 
elections.  
Vendors now provide:  
♦ Equipment to run elections 
♦ Software to run the equipment 
♦ Installation of the equipment 
 
♦ Training on the equipment 
♦ Ballots – printed and on screen 
♦ Ballot programming  
♦ Pre-Election and even acceptance testing of their equipment 
♦ Maintenance, upgrades, and repairs of the equipment 
♦ Election-Day assistance for election workers and administrators 
♦ Results retrieval, especially when something goes wrong 
♦ Troubleshooting and investigation into the cause of problems 
♦ Recounts — with all the same support 
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Election Systems (formerly Diebold), though a few other corporations have a very small share of the market. 
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Meanwhile, states pass laws requiring high-tech equipment based on the technology currently 
offered by vendors. Members of Congress periodically introduce bills that would require 
higher-tech equipment that isn’t yet invented, give legal priority to vendors’ claims of trade 
secrecy over citizens’ rights to observe their elections, and even invite the vendors to sit at the 
table where standards for voting systems are developed.4  
Vendors exploit these opportunities to increase their profits and expand their control, and with 
each extension of vendors’ reach into election management, more reach becomes possible. 
If they withdrew their support now, our election structure would collapse.  
The case studies and incidents described in this report give evidence that the vendors are using 
the threat of withdrawing support to dictate conditions of their support and to charge 
unexpected increases in fees.  
 
Control vs. Accountability 
Local officials remain legally accountable to the people to run elections and comply with state 
and federal laws, but vendors fall outside the chain of command. Even though vendors are now 
in practical control of elections — supplying equipment and supplies to run elections, providing 
ballot programming for counting the votes, and even in many cases retrieving results — 
vendors are not held legally accountable when these goods or services fail.  
While vendors are in control, election officials are accountable. 
In an April 2006 lawsuit filed by the State of Oregon against a voting system vendor for breach 
of contract, the plaintiff makes this untenable situation very clear:  
 “The breach did not relieve plaintiff of its obligation to provide HAVA-compliant voting 
systems for the May 2006 primary election.”5 
 
But some states and localities are recognizing the danger of vendor-dependence and taking 
steps to rebuild their election structures on a more vendor-independent foundation. Election 
officials and private citizens alike can participate in the re-construction by taking actions that 
the laws currently allow — even in 2008 — to oversee vendors’ equipment and services and 
regain ownership of U.S. elections.  
                                                     
4 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=s110-3212 
5 State of Oregon v. Election Systems & Software, Inc. Complaint for Breach of Contract. Case No. 06C13803. April 
19, 2006. http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/Oregon/Oregon_ESSComplaint_041906.pdf, page 4. 
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Undermining Elections: Case Studies 
Case Study of Angelina County, Texas. 
The county’s dependence on ES&S for all phases of election administration undermines 
the county’s election structure. By threatening to withdraw support, ES&S is able to 
dictate conditions that increase the county’s dependence. 
The Angelina County incident started when a technician from ES&S, the county’s voting system 
vendor, assisted with the March 2008 election by retrieving results, but he tallied the votes 
incorrectly. The error was noticed by Thelma “Midget” Sherman, Angelina County tax assessor-
collector/election administrator and Jim Wark, Angelina County’s Democratic Party chairman. 
Together, they petitioned a judge to allow a recount. Mr. Wark also attempted to hold the 
vendor accountable: 6 
Wark sent a four-page letter to the secretary of state’s election leader, the state 
Democratic Party chair and the president of the company that sent the site support, 
Election Systems & Software based in Omaha, Neb. 
“The letter requests that action be taken by the secretary of state and the democratic 
party chair against ES&S for sending an unqualified person down here to tally the 
votes,” Wark said. “His actions created a dark cloud over this election, both parties and 
the tax collector.” 
The judge granted the petition, so the county proceeded to plan the date and the recount 
process. But correspondence between Ms. Sherman and ES&S show that Ms. Sherman 
encountered a severe obstacle: ES&S threatened to withdraw the support necessary for the 
recount and all future elections unless Ms. Sherman agreed to certain conditions — conditions 
she could only meet with timely support from ES&S. 
On June 13, 2008, Black Box Voting (www.blackboxvoting.org) sent an open records request to 
Ms. Sherman, requesting correspondence and invoices related to the miscount and subsequent 
related events.7 The county’s response illuminates the way in which ES&S has undermined 
Angelina County’s election structure and then further eroded the structure when the company’s 
COO threatened to withdraw the election support on which the county had become wholly 
dependent. The records reveal [numbers in square brackets in the following text reference the 
pages in the pdf file8 containing the county’s response to BBV]:  
♦ On April 28, ES&S Sheri Menges denied — without explanation — Ms. Sherman’s request 
for on-site support for the November 2008 general election and referred her to Mr. Gary 
Crump for further discussion. [45] 
♦ On May 15, two days after the judge ordered a recount of the March election, Mr. Gary 
Crump, Chief Operating Officer of ES&S, left Ms. Sherman a voice mail telling her that she 
“would be allowed” site support for the recount, but only if she signed and returned a letter 
he had mailed to her. [8] (This is the recount made necessary by ES&S’ technician’s error.) 
                                                     
6 When does your vote not count? When it isn’t counted: Angelina County officials upset with technician, but say 
glitch won’t change election results. The Lufkin Daily News, April 19, 2008. By BRITTONY LUND. Archived at: 
http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7672 
7 http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/171/75764.html?1215618531 
8 http://www.bbvdocs.org/TX/angelina/2008-Jun-TX-Angelina-PRRresp.pdf 
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♦ Mr. Crump’s letter said that the conditions applied to all elections “going forward” (thus, 
the November 2008 election as well). His letter [48] and her response [49] also reveal that 
Mr. Crump coerced Ms. Sherman to agree to actions that it was not within her power to 
complete. Her office would be unable to fulfill them without timely cooperation and 
support from ES&S.  
♦ Mr. Crump’s final sentence of the letter is: “ES&S will not provide Angelina County with 
site support until this letter is received.”  
To understand the implications of this threat, it is necessary to understand that Angelina 
County was, at that point, wholly dependent on ES&S on-site support to conduct the recount, as 
well as any future election. 
♦ Email exchanges between Ms. Sherman and Zachary Austrew of ES&S, regarding the April 
8th run-off election [2-5] and invoices from ES&S to Angelina County [15-40] show that 
Angelina County depended on ES&S for:  
- providing the equipment and supplies for the election, 
- designing and printing the paper ballots,  
- marking the paper test ballots for pre-election testing,  
- programming the ballots for the iVotronics,  
- setting up the audio for the iVotronics designated as accessible for people with disabilities, 
- burning the memory cards for the M100 optical scanners, 
- burning the flashcards and memory cartridges for the iVotronics 
- setting up the Election Reporting Manager program, and 
- providing election-day support, including retrieving results and reporting outcomes.  
Note: Invoices also reveal that ES&S charged Angelina County  $3900.00 for the work of the 
technician who caused the miscount, and the county approved payment [20]. As of June 12, 
2008, no record indicates that ES&S was going to compensate the county for any of the 
recount costs. Ms. Sherman could not be reached by phone for an update. 
♦ ES&S set the date for the recount. In email negotiations with Ms. Sherman, ES&S’ Mark 
Allison said, “we will set it up for the 4th.”[9] She responded that she would try to set June 
4th as the date for the recount, but she wasn’t sure if all the necessary county people would 
be available.[9] Note: The recount did end up being held on June 4th.  
Without ES&S’s on-site support for the recount on the date set by ES&S, the recount simply 
wouldn’t happen. Neither Ms. Sherman nor her staff knew how to operate the Election 
Reporting Manager (ERM) program required to re-collect the votes from the memory cards, and 
operating the ERM was essential to the recount process.[49]  
When Ms. Sherman received Mr. Crump’s threat letter, ES&S had already set the recount date 
for two weeks away, and the judge’s deadline for the recount was only 3½ weeks away.  
While ES&S refusal to provide on-site support would be the direct cause of the court order 
violation, Ms. Sherman — not ES&S — was accountable to meet the deadline. 
As Ms. Sherman explained to ES&S Mark Allison [43]:  
I have a Court Ordered Recount that I need site support on because of the errors that 
were completely out of my control. Mr. Crump did say I needed to sign the letter and 
return it to him but he stated a couple of things in the letter that I think the County 
Attorney needs to address, so I guess you can say my hands are tied at this time as well 
as yours. We may all have to go back [sic] the District Court to explain why I can’t 
meet the deadline. 
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Nevertheless, Ms. Sherman did return the letter, signed, with a supplemental letter of her own 
dated May 20, 2008. [48, 49] It would be difficult to overstate the significance of her decision to 
sign the letter even though the County Attorney was “out of town for a week.”[43] Her 
supplemental letter [49] provides more insight into how ES&S used the threat of a recount 
collapse, to take control — in two specific ways — over whether or not the county’s November 
2008 election collapses. 
1. In order to receive the support she needed to comply with a court order to complete the 
recount within 30 days, she officially agreed to run the Election Reporting Manager (ERM) 
herself in all future elections.  
Ironically, the reason she needed support for the recount was that ES&S technicians had 
always retrieved election results using the ERM system, as she said in her response letter, 
“as if it were their’s [sic] to do, so we allowed it, consequently this is why we aren’t 
educated well enough to run it ourselves at this time.” 
But using the ERM system was essential to the recount process. So, because she didn’t know 
how to run the ERM for the recount (which was only two weeks away), she was coerced by 
ES&S into agreeing to run the ERM in all future elections. Both she and Mr. Crump knew 
that she was also dependent on ES&S to provide the training she would need. He even 
pointed it out in his letter to her.  
While it is certainly advisable for the county election administrator to run the election, the 
way in which that change came about reveals much about the danger of vendor control. By 
threatening to remove the only support propping up the county’s recount, ES&S extorted 
Ms. Sherman to agree to something over which ES&S, not Ms. Sherman, had control. If 
ES&S is unable or unwilling to schedule the training she needs before November, Ms. 
Sherman will be unable to run the election and will have broken her agreement. Based on 
her inability to run the election herself, ES&S could refuse to supply site support for the 
November election. The election would collapse. 
2. Mr. Crump also threatened Ms. Sherman into agreeing to complete all pre-election testing 
before Early Voting, yet both parties knew that she was completely dependent on ES&S to 
provide the materials necessary for pre-election testing. Furthermore, as she pointed out in 
her supplemental letter, the company had failed to provide those materials in a timely 
manner in the past.  
So, Ms. Sherman officially agreed to two items she and Mr. Crump both knew she would be 
unable to fulfill without support from ES&S, a company that had failed her in the past. And this 
was on the heels of ES&S’ unexplained threat to withdraw support for the recount and the 
November 2008 election.   
By ES&S’ unexplained refusal to provide support for a recount made necessary because its own 
technician botched the initial count, ES&S has demonstrated its willingness to withdraw the 
support propping up Angelina County’s election structure.  
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ES&S has thoroughly undermined 
Angelina County’s election structure, 
which is now propped up only by 
fragile support from ES&S. ES&S has 
failed the county in the past, 
invoiced for its failures, threatened to 
withdraw support without 
explanation, and forced Ms. Sherman 
to be wholly dependent on ES&S’ 
support in the future in order for her 
to fulfill her official agreement with 
them.  
The county is so dependent on ES&S 
that Ms. Sherman cannot hold 
elections without support from 
ES&S. Using that dependence like a 
club over her, ES&S bullied her into 
signing an agreement that she cannot 
keep without support from ES&S.   
Unfortunately, Ms. Sherman is not alone. News reports and statements from election officials in 
other states attest to the fact that this type of support from ES&S is all too common. For 
example, on March 3, 2007, the Texarkana Gazette reported that Miller County Arkansas 
Election Administrator Robby Selph resigned from his job saying this about Election Systems 
and Software:9  
The reason I am leaving is the provider of the Ivotronics [sic] and related software 
lacks competency to make their equipment work timely and effectively. They ... make a 
difficult job impossible to do. They can’t spell, meet deadlines, send documents to the 
right address or code elections correctly. They leave races off the ballot for us to 
correct, they can’t program their software to work and you have to hand add the 
results. And they don’t return phone calls. The ES&S people in Arkansas are capable 
but the people I have dealt with in the home office in Omaha prevent them from being 
effective. They are also mean-spirited when you try to get them to correct the 
numerous and recurring errors. 
 
                                                     
9 http://www.bradblog.com/?p=4218 
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Case Study of Nassau County, New York.  
To comply with a federal court order, Nassau County purchases ballot-marking devices 
from Sequoia Voting Systems. Of the first 240 devices delivered, 85% are too defective to 
be usable, placing the county in jeopardy of violating the court order. 
The federal Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) spells out certain requirements for voting 
systems and sets a deadline by which all states must comply with those requirements. Among 
HAVA’s mandates is the requirement for one accessible device in each polling place for use by 
people with disabilities. New York State missed the deadline, and the U.S. Department of 
Justice filed a Motion to Enforce.  
Relevant to this case study is the “Supplemental Court Order” that U.S. District Judge Gary L. 
Sharpe signed on January 16, 2008. Judge Sharpe granted the Motion to Enforce and ordered, in 
part, that by the September 2008 primary elections, all counties in the state must provide, per 
HAVA, one ballot-marking device (BMD) in each polling place:10 
... the deployment of ballot marking devices accessible to person with disabilities in 
every polling place in the State for use in the fall 2008 federal primary and general 
elections... shall be implemented in full by the Defendants. 
By this point, time was short and New York State law requires that accessible voting equipment 
be capable of being equipped with a pneumatic switch voting attachment, such as a “sip-and-
puff” attachment, for use by people with physical disabilities.11 So, the county’s choices were 
limited to a few high-tech systems currently manufactured by voting system vendors. In this 
manner, the combination of federal law and state decisions compelled New York counties to use 
an existing vendor’s voting equipment, thus facilitating the dependence of New York State’s 
election structure on voting system vendors.  
In order to comply with the court order, Nassau County contracted with Sequoia Voting 
Systems, Inc. to purchase 450 ImageCast optical scanners, which also serve as ballot-marking 
devices and include the “sip-and-puff” attachment required by the New York legislature. Kim 
Zetter describes the machine in a subsequent news article about the county:12  
The ImageCast machines are special optical-scan machines that include an LCD screen, 
a printer and a ballot-marking device that allows disabled voters to use them. Disabled 
voters view the ballot on screen or hear it read to them through headphones, then 
make their selection using special attachments (a device with buttons or a sipping 
straw), after which the machine prints out a paper ballot that gets read by the optical 
scanner component. 
Thus, Nassau County (as well as dozens of other New York counties that contracted to purchase 
the ImageCast) became wholly dependent on Sequoia in order to comply with U.S. District 
Judge Sharpe’s order. Without Sequoia’s timely support in providing well-functioning 
equipment, Nassau County would be in violation of the federal court order. 
                                                     
10 http://www.nyvv.org/newdoc/doj/DOJvNYOrder011608.pdf 
11 State of New York 2008 Election Law. § 7-202.2.c. 
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/download/law/2008NYElectionLaw.pdf, page 234. 
12 NY: 50 Percent of Sequoia Voting Machines Flawed. Wired Blog Network. July 14, 2008 By Kim Zetter. 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/07/ny-50-percent-o.html 
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Sequoia’s severely flawed performance put the county at risk.  
By June 26, 2008, Nassau County had received 156 of the BMDs from Sequoia. 133 (85%) of the 
ballot-marking devices were so defective they were unusable. The county legislature and 
board of elections wrote a joint letter to Judge Sharpe informing him of the problem and 
alerting him to the fact that the situation “threatens compliance with the Court’s Order.” In that 
letter they point out specific problems with the equipment received from Sequoia. 13 
29 were rejected immediately when they were unloaded from the truck because of 
obvious physical defects or damages, such as a broken side of the printer. 62 failed 
diagnostic testing because of problems with the USB cord and the printer. And 42 
failed Nassau’s acceptance testing for a variety of reasons, such as nonresponsive key 
pads and battery failure. Out of a total of 156 BMDs, only 23 can be used by voters in 
the condition they were received in.  
On July 1, the county legislature and board of elections wrote another letter to Judge Sharpe, 
telling him that they had received two additional shipments, with similar percentages of 
“unusable” equipment in the new shipments. Then they describe the status of Sequoia’s 
support:14  
Despite the County’s demands, Sequoia has failed to fix a single broken BMD or to 
give any indication when the BMDs will be repaired. 
They end the letter with a concise summary of how the “control vs accountability” inequity is 
impacting their county: 
We believe this matter is extremely urgent because the defective BMD’s jeopardize the 
implementation of this Court’s January 16, 2008 Order. ... Without swift action, Nassau 
County, through no fault of its own, may be unable to provide functioning BMDs in 
the majority of polling places in the fall 2008 elections. 
By this time, the county had received 240 machines, with a continuing defective rate of 85%. A 
news article by Kim Zetter15 relates that, “The problems include printers jamming, broken 
monitors and wheels, machines that wouldn’t boot up, and misaligned printer covers that 
prevented the covers from closing completely, creating security concerns.” The article 
continues:  
Another 112 machines produced a “printer failure” error message. Biamonte [William 
Biamonte, the Democratic elections commissioner for Nassau County] says this was the 
result of a change Sequoia made to its firmware. He said that when he received his first 
batch of machines about a month ago, the machines had “horrific paper jams.” To fix 
the problem, Sequoia loaded new firmware on the systems to speed up the printer, but 
in doing so disabled the USB port on machines, resulting in the “printer failure” error 
messages. 
... 
Biamonte... said a state worker told him he should instruct election workers to just 
ignore the error message. 
... 
“How is that acceptable?” Biamonte asked. “Say you buy a brand new car and it works 
                                                     
13 http://www.nyvv.org/newdoc/2008/letter_re_BMD_problems_06272008.pdf 
14 http://www.nyvv.org/newdoc/2008/NassauLetterUSCourt07012008.pdf 
15 NY: 50 Percent of Sequoia Voting Machines Flawed. Wired Blog Network. July 14, 2008 By Kim Zetter. 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/07/ny-50-percent-o.html 
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good but the oil gauge isn’t working. They tell you, Just drive it anyway. These are 
brand new machines. $12,000 each. We cannot in confidence send (them) out to a 
polling place knowing they have this printer error. How do we know if we really do 
have a printer failure?” 
... 
A Sequoia spokeswoman would say only that the company is working with state 
officials “to identify and resolve any voting equipment concerns they may have.” 
Ironically, while Nassau County purchased these machines from Sequoia for the sole purpose of 
printing ballots marked by voters with disabilities (the scanner function will not be used), it was 
the printing function that failed in nearly half of the machines they received.  
In August, Mr. Biamonte told the 
author that Sequoia had been 
repairing the equipment and most 
of the machines appeared to 
working, though some worked 
intermittently. But, because the 
diagnostic function of the machines 
does not work properly with the 
newly installed firmware, the 
diagnostic function will be disabled 
while the machines are in use. He 
likened it to driving a car with the 
dashboard controls disabled.  
Undermined by the county’s 
dependence on Sequoia, Nassau 
County’s ability to hold a legal 
election in 2008 now rests on 
Sequoia’s broken support.   
Unfortunately, Nassau County is not alone. As of mid-July, counties in the state of New York 
had received about 1500 BMDs from Sequoia. Half the machines were too defective to use for 
the purpose for which they were intended.  
While Sequoia had repaired most of them by the date of this report, 514 had not yet been 
delivered by July 31, 2008, the court-ordered delivery deadline. Sequoia promised to deliver the 
rest by August 15, but even if they fulfill the promise, the delay further shortens the already 
tight timetable faced by the counties to prepare for the primary and general elections.16 
The words of Douglas Kellner, co-chair of the New York State Board of Elections, demonstrate 
the logical result of vendors having control with no accountability.17  
There’s no way the vendor could be adequately reviewing the machines and having so 
many problems ... What it tells us is that the vendor just throws this stuff over the transom 
and does not do any alpha- or beta-testing of their own before they apply for certification 
testing. Then they expect that we’ll identify technical glitches and then they’ll correct those 
glitches. But correction of those glitches is an extraordinarily time-consuming process. And 
its [sic] very disappointing that this equipment is not ready for prime time. 
                                                     
16 Email from Douglas Kellner. 
17 NY: 50 Percent of Sequoia Voting Machines Flawed. Wired Blog Network. July 14, 2008 By Kim Zetter. 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/07/ny-50-percent-o.html 
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Case Study of San Diego, California.  
Diebold’s unauthorized and illegal installation of voting equipment and software causes 
an election debacle. 
On November 10, 2003, the California Voting Systems and Procedures Panel (VSPP) initiated an 
audit of the 17 California counties using Diebold voting systems.  
The audit discovered that Diebold had, in fact, installed uncertified [by the state] 
software in all its client counties without notifying the Secretary of State as required by 
law, and that the software was not federally qualified in three client counties. Diebold 
eventually acknowledged that it had failed to notify the Secretary of State of its 
proposed system modifications, and that its failure to obtain certification for those 
modifications violated state law.18 
The staff report states further that Diebold had marketed, sold, and installed its new touch 
screen machines (TSx) in San Diego County (as well as three others) “prior to full testing, prior 
to federal qualification, and without complying with the state certification requirements.”   
Diebold illegally installed a voting system with touch screen machines and tabulation software 
that had neither been certified by the state nor federally qualified, even though state law 
required both. In fact, Diebold sold and installed the system in San Diego County (and three 
others) before the company even applied for state certification.  
The counties insisted there was insufficient time to replace their voting systems before the 
primary. Less than a month before the primary election, independent testers gave limited 
approval to use the TSx system installed in San Diego County, on a one-time basis, but only if 
certain software “patches” were used. So, with this limited approval:  
Shortly before the election, Diebold engaged in a crash project to install the patches on 
its California voting machines.  
However, as the Secretary of State learned later, Diebold neglected to install the patch on 24 of 
San Diego’s machines. On those machines, according to Diebold’s Bob Urosevich, “there were 
changes to the Cross-Over reporting.”19 Mr. Urosevich then claims that these votes were 
corrected before they were sent to the Secretary as part of the official statement of vote.20 
A near repeat of the TSx story occurred with Diebold’s Precinct Control Module (PCM), which 
Diebold claimed was essential to the operation of San Diego’s TSx system. The PCM writes data 
to the Voter Access Cards, which voters insert into the touch screens in order to cast votes. The 
staff report says: 
As with the TSx, Diebold sought certification of the PCM less than two months before 
the election, without having completed federal testing and with counties asserting the 
election could not be conducted without PCM approval. After limited testing, the ITAs 
[Independent Testing Authorities] approved the units for one time use only, while 
stating a number of concerns regarding its performance.  
                                                     
18 Staff Report on the Investigation of Diebold Election Systems, Inc. April 20,2004. Presented to Secretary of State 
Kevin Shelley and the Voting Systems and Procedures Panel. Page 2. 
19 Votes of unaffiliated voters in partisan contests for which such “cross-over voting” is allowed by the party.  
20 Staff Report on the Investigation of Diebold Election Systems, Inc. Appendix A. 
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The unqualified, uncertified systems that Diebold illegally installed in San Diego County 
caused severe and varied problems during the election — even with the one-time-only patch 
installed on most of the units: 
♦ The tabulation software switched 2,747 Democratic presidential primary votes for U.S. 
Sen. John Kerry to U.S. Rep. Dick Gephardt.  
Diebold’s latest explanation says its vote-tabulation software apparently could not 
handle results from multiple optical-scanning machines, processing ballots with large 
numbers of candidates and precincts.21 
♦ Ten votes were inexplicably lost on the touch screen machines at one polling place alone.  
John Pilch, a retired insurance agent who worked as a polling place inspector in San 
Carlos, said that when polls closed at 8 p.m. Tuesday, the number of people who 
signed the voter log differed from the number of ballots counted by computers.  
“We lost 10 votes, and the Diebold technician who was there had no explanation,” said 
Pilch, who registered complaints with elections officials, his county supervisor and 
several others. “She kept looking at the tapes.” 22 
♦ The machines allowed voters to unknowingly cast multiple ballots.  
In Carmel Valley, one voter said she was allowed to cast a second ballot after the 
computer spit out her activation card while she was weighing her choices. She later 
said the card showed that her original vote had been counted.23 
♦ The malfunctioning machines disenfranchised untold numbers of voters. 
Hundreds of voters, perhaps even thousands, were turned away from their polling 
place because the machines were not operating as planned.24 
♦ In San Diego and Alameda Counties, one-fourth of the PCMs, reluctantly approved for 
one time use only, failed.  
Poll workers saw unfamiliar Windows screens, frozen screens, strange error messages 
and login boxes none of which they’d been trained to expect.  
A report released Monday by Diebold Election Systems shows that 186 of 763 devices 
known as voter-card encoders failed on election day because of hardware or software 
problems or both, with only a minority of problems attributable to poll worker 
training.25 
Contrary to Diebold’s promise to the California Secretary of State, the company never obtained, 
nor even pursued, federal qualification for the voting system that malfunctioned so badly in San 
Diego’s March 2004 primary election.  
                                                     
21 Diebold reports multiple problems: Registrar wants reason for e-voting. TriValley Herald. April 13, 2004. By Ian 
Hoffman, Staff Writer. Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=2390 
22 Poll workers, voters cite tied-up hotline, poor training, confusion. Union Tribune; March 7, 2004; By Jeff 
McDonald and Luis Monteagudo Jr. http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/politics/20040307-9999-1n7vote.html 
Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=1454 
23 Poll workers, voters cite tied-up hotline, poor training, confusion. 
24 Poll workers, voters cite tied-up hotline, poor training, confusion. 
25 Diebold reports multiple problems: Registrar wants reason for e-voting. 
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In April 2004, California Secretary of State Kevin Shelley called on the state’s attorney general to 
bring criminal charges against Diebold for fraud.26 But in September, Attorney General Bill 
Lockyer announced he would not pursue criminal charges against Diebold.  
Instead, Lockyer eventually joined 
Alameda County and two election 
activists, Bev Harris and Jim March, 
in pursuing and winning a 
monetary false claims judgment 
against Diebold.27  
But the monetary damages were 
small in comparison to Diebold’s 
income from the election equipment 
it sold in California.  
Since public officials do not hold 
voting system vendors criminally 
liable for deliberate, illegal actions 
that result in disenfranchised voters 
and botched elections, there is little 
to deter vendors from continuing to 
undermine elections.  
 
Diebold is still marketing, selling, and installing its voting systems in jurisdictions throughout 
the United States — now under the name “Premier Election Systems.”  
                                                     
26 California Bans E-Vote Machines. Wired News. April 30, 2004. By Kim Zetter.  
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,63298,00.html 
27 State joins lawsuit against Diebold. Tri-Valley Herald. September 8, 2004. By Ian Hoffman, Staff Writer. 
http://www.trivalleyherald.com/Stories/0,1413,86~10671~2387400,00.html.  
Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=2733 
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Case Study of Hawaii.  
State officials have handed elections to voting system vendors. Now the state cannot run 
elections without a vendor. 
In 2004, two vendors programmed the elections, tallied the votes, and counted the turnout. The 
vendors’ poor performance didn’t deter the state from continuing this practice.  
♦ An error in Hart InterCivic’s ballot programming allowed voters to vote a straight-party 
Green ticket, even though no Green candidates were running. The official response shows 
the state’s plan to continue depending on the vendor for this service:28  
State elections officials said the computerized voting machines provided by Hart 
Intercivic allowed voters to “click on” a political party, even though there weren’t any 
candidates running from that party on their island. 
So a couple of dozen Green Party ballots were recorded, even though there were no 
candidates. 
“We brought that up to the vendor already. They will change that for the next 
election,” [elections spokesman Rex] Quidilla said. 
♦ When the two vendors made errors, described as “counting turnout differently,” Mr. 
Quidilla’s response to the vendors shows that the vendors were not held accountable:  
Elections officials said they made a mistake in calculating the primary turnout totals, 
but the results of individual races did not change. State elections officials have revised 
their primary election turnout figures upward. They now say 252,630 people voted in 
Saturday’s election. Their preliminary count was 4,000 votes fewer than that. 
For the first time, there were two election-counting vendors this year. One company 
counted the paper ballots and another company tallied electronic votes on computers 
used mostly by those with disabilities. The companies counted turnout differently, 
resulting in the discrepancy. 
“We found this and we made proper adjustments,” elections spokesman Rex Quidilla 
said. “These are routine corrections after each election.” 
The 2006 elections saw vendors running every aspect of the Hawaii elections again. Bob Babson, 
an election observer on Maui during that election, wrote to the author:  
In 2006, Hart InterCivic and ES&S did just about everything in administering the 
elections. Hawaii gave them the names of the candidates and they did the rest. They 
printed the ballots, wrote the software, designed the hardware. Hawaii volunteers ran 
the precincts but as soon as the memory cards arrived at the county count centers, they 
were simply handed to ES&S and Hart representatives who “read” them into their 
tabulator which was connected to a telephone line.  They [ES&S and Hart] had 100% 
control of all Hawaii votes in their computers at the State count center at the end of 
election day when they tabulated the final results. They then printed the final results in 
pdf format. So I believe you could say they conducted our elections “turn key.” 
                                                     
28 Primary Election Runs Into Problems. HITV 4. The Hawaii Channel. September 24, 2004. 
http://www.thehawaiichannel.com/news/3760175/detail.html Archived at 
http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=2926 
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In 2008, a single vendor will run the elections. The contract for Hawaii elections through 2016 
(with an option for 2018) was awarded to Hart InterCivic. ES&S, which also bid on the contract, 
challenged the state’s decision, claiming Hart’s proposal was unreasonably high. By state 
procurement law, ES&S’ challenge automatically triggered a stay on the contract. Subsequent 
events demonstrate the state’s complete dependence on a vendor to administer elections.29  
♦ In May 2008, Aaron Fujioka, the state procurement officer, initially refused to lift the stay, 
but relented when Kevin Cronin, the chief election officer, argued that time was running out 
to have a voting system in place for the September primary election. 
♦ In June, the administrative hearings officer who reviewed the ES&S challenge reversed the 
decision, stopping work again. But on June 30, Fujioka said that the delay “places at great 
risk the voters’ right to an efficient and effective statewide election.” He found that there 
was a substantial state interest — conducting the elections — that justified lifting the stay. 
The Hawaii 67AM KPUA News summarized the situation (highlighting added):30  
The contract with Hart InterCivic for paper eScan and electronic eSlate voting machines 
will proceed because the September primary election and November general election 
could be in jeopardy if Hawaii doesn’t have a company in place to administer them. 
♦ But on August 7, Craig Uyehara, an administrative hearings officer for the state Department 
of Commerce and Consumer Affairs, ruled that the contract was awarded in bad faith and 
should be canceled. However, he also determined that it was too late to cancel it for 2008.31 
Hawaii is now so dependent on a 
vendor to run elections that an 
officer of the state believes delaying 
cancellation of an invalid contract 
with a vendor is necessary to ensure 
that the 2008 elections can be held.  
Scott Nago, Hawaii’s Counting 
Center Section Head, confirmed this 
absolute dependency.  
When asked by the author if the 
vendor did everything for the 
elections: equipment maintenance, 
ballot programming, retrieving 
results, and all the rest, Mr. Nago 
said:  
Correct. 
 
                                                     
29 Vote preparations resume. State gearing up to use new ballot machines despite bid dispute. 
Honolulu Advertiser. July 2, 2008. By Derrick DePledge, Advertiser Government Writer. 
Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7791 
30 Disputed voting machines go ahead. Hawaii News, July 3, 2008; http://www.kpua.net/news.php?id=15262 
Archived at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7810 
31 Voting-machine deal in jeopardy. HonoluluAdvertiser.com. August 10, 2008. By Derrick DePledge 
http://www.honoluluadvertiser.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080810/NEWS01/808100378/1001/LOCALNEWSFRONT 
Archive at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7836 
Vendors are Undermining the Structure of U.S. Elections Page 21 
by Ellen Theisen, VotersUnite.Org.  August 18, 2008 Undermining Elections: Case Studies 
Unfortunately, Hawaii is not alone in its dependence on Hart InterCivic. Inthe company’s 
marketing documents, Hart touts the full service election management it provides to customers.  
Hart’s “Installations and Letters of Reference”32 — provided to Boulder County, Colorado, 
during their 2003 negotiations — shows the extent to which Hart controls all phases of the 
elections for many of its clients. For example: 
For Arapahoe County, Colorado, Hart InterCivic controlled these phases of the 2002 primary 
and general elections (page 4):  
♦ Formatting absentee ballots  
♦ Printing absentee ballots,  
♦ Scanning absentee ballots and resolving ballots marked as having a “Damaged Contest” 
♦ Tabulating absentee results 
♦ Reporting absentee results 
♦ Configuring and deploying the eSlate e-voting machines in Early Voting 
♦ Comprehensive precinct level reporting 
♦ Integration of election results from the county’s old Sequoia system used for Election 
Day with the new Hart systems used for Early Voting and absentee voting. 
For Philadelphia, Hart InterCivic controlled these phases of the 2002 general election (page 8): 
♦ Formatting absentee ballots 
♦ Printing absentee ballots 
♦ Scanning absentee ballots and resolving ballots marked as having a “Damaged Contest” 
♦ Tabulating absentee results 
♦ Reporting absentee results 
♦ Exporting absentee results to Danaher software to consolidate with polling place results.  
Philadelphia’s continuing implementation plan also includes: 
♦ Installation of additional equipment,  
♦ Training city election staff, and  
♦ Providing pre-election and Election Day support. 
Hart InterCivic’s proposal to Boulder County, Colorado offers all this control and more, 
including performing the county’s acceptance testing of the equipment Hart InterCivic was 
proposing to sell to the county. 33 
Many jurisdictions whose elections depend on Hart InterCivic are experiencing the impact of 
the company’s undermining. In the 2006 mid-term elections, two counties surrounding Austin, 
Texas (Travis and Hays) and the only three Virginia cities using Hart’s equipment found that 
their electronic voting machines truncated the names of candidates on the review screen.34 
Travis County Clerk Dana DeBeauvoir said the cutoff of names is frustrating.  
“I don’t like it. We’ve been asking the vendor to address this issue for a couple of years 
now,” she said.35 
                                                     
32 http://www.bbvdocs.org/hart/Attach15.pdf 
33 http://www.bbvdocs.org/hart/Sec3.pdf, page 7 
34 http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp?sort=date&selectvendor=Hart+InterCivic 
35 Voting machines chop off candidates’ names. Computer glitch affects eSlate machines used in Travis, Hays 
counties; error cannot be fixed by Nov. 7. AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN. October 26, 2006. By Tara Copp. 
http://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/local/10/26/26glitch.html. 
Archive: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=6677  
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Government Facilitation of Vendor-Dependency 
Federal “Help America Vote Act of 2002”: a Vendor’s Dream Come True 
Congress sets the stage for increased vendor dependency.  
In October of 2002, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), which was 
purported to improve election systems nationwide. However, HAVA set the stage for voting 
system vendors to significantly increase not only their sales, but also their control over elections. 
The federal law did this by: 
♦ Requiring, nationwide, enhancements to voting systems for every polling place. 
♦ Suggesting specific high-tech products produced and planned by the major vendors. 
♦ Providing over $3 billion to be disbursed to the states to fulfill these and other requirements. 
♦ Setting a deadline that allowed three years for the requirements to be implemented.  
In an attempt to receive the federal grant money under HAVA’s time table, the states replaced 
or enhanced their existing voting systems with systems that vendors claimed were in 
compliance with HAVA. 
The voting system vendors sold billions of dollars of equipment to the states, asserting that it 
was what the states needed to comply with federal law. And since the equipment was so high-
tech, so complex, and so far beyond the average election administrator’s range of expertise, the 
vendors are now charging steep fees for maintenance, election support, and other services the 
jurisdictions depend on. 
Congress set the stage, and the vendors collected a heavy flow of federal funds that paid for 
much of the cost of the equipment and installation. But HAVA doesn’t pay for subsequent years 
of maintenance, support, and assistance. Now that the local jurisdictions have become 
dependent on high-tech devices to administer elections, they are being crushed under the 
invoices from the vendors that maintain and support those devices. 
Disturbingly, many of these devices are not auditable as required by HAVA, are not accessible 
as required by HAVA,36 and do not report votes accurately as required by HAVA.37  
Furthermore, the use of these devices increases vendor-dependency not only because of the 
localities’ dependence on the goods and services of the vendors, but also because the American 
people are forced to depend on the vendors’ inherently unobservable software, rendering the 
public unable to oversee and verify public elections. 
                                                     
36 Accessibility Review Report for California Top-to-Bottom Voting Systems Review. Noel Runyan and Jim Tobias. 
July 26, 2007. http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/ 
accessibility_review_report_california_ttb_absolute_final_version16.pdf. and  
Improving Access To Voting: A Report on the Technology for Accessible Voting Systems. February 2007 By Noel 
H. Runyan. http://www.voteraction.org/reports/nrreport/Improving_Access_to_Voting_.pdf. 
37 http://www.votersunite.org/info/AccuracyIgnored.asp 
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Federal Violations of Federal Law Leave States in a Double Bind. 
The federal government fails to meet its HAVA deadlines for giving guidance to the 
states on how to comply with HAVA, yet states are held accountable to comply.38 
On October 29, 2002, the President signed HAVA into law. As of February 27, 2003 and 
continuing until the end of December of 2003, the federal government was in violation of that 
law. Repercussions of the violation are described below. 
HAVA established the federal Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and required the EAC to 
develop voting systems standards by January 1, 2004. The standards were intended to guide the 
states as they upgraded their election equipment to meet the HAVA requirements by the 
January 1, 2006 deadline.  
In violation of HAVA, the Congress and the President delayed the appointment of the members 
of the EAC for more than nine months after the HAVA deadline — two weeks before the 
statutory deadline for providing the voting system standards. Furthermore, although HAVA 
authorized up to $10 million for each year from 2003 to 2005 for the EAC to carry out its duties, 
Congress appropriated only $2 million for 2003 and the EAC was not formed in time to use the 
funds. Only $1.2 million was appropriated for 2004.39 
On April 30, 2004, the EAC reported its concern about this situation to Congress, listing nine of 
the Commission’s missed deadlines caused by the delay in its establishment and the lack of 
funding. Following the list, the EAC correctly predicts the impact of these delays on the states. 
The EAC reported:40 
The implications of these delays are likely to include continued problems with election 
equipment; other unresolved election administration issues such as voter verifiable 
paper audit; and the likely inability of States and local election jurisdictions to meet 
HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. 
As of the end of Fiscal Year 2004, only $1.2 million (4% of the $30 million authorized by HAVA) 
had been made available by the federal government to support the work of the EAC in 
developing guidance needed by the states to implement HAVA requirements. In contrast, $1.3 
billion had been disbursed to the States to pour into the purchase of voting systems without the 
benefit of the guidance and assistance mandated by HAVA.41 
In January of 2005, the EAC again voiced its concern that states were expected to meet HAVA 
requirements without benefit of the prerequisite guidance mandated by HAVA:42  
Perhaps the most serious implication of the delayed EAC startup is the impact it will 
have on State procurement of new election equipment and the ability of some States 
and local election jurisdictions to meet HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines. 
                                                     
38 Adapted from: Is HAVA Being Abused? Part II: Good for the Goose; Why Not for the Gander? by Ellen Theisen, 
June 4, 2005. http://www.votersunite.org/info/hava-abuse2.asp. 
39 U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Annual Report. Fiscal Year 2003. April, 2004.  Page 11. 
http://www.eac.gov/about/report/docs/2003annualreport.pdf/attachment_download/file 
 U.S. Election Assistance Commission. Fiscal Year 2004 Annual Report. January 2005. Page 3. 
http://www.eac.gov/about/report/docs/annualreportfy04.pdf/attachment_download/file 
40 EAC 2003 Annual Report. Page 2. 
41 EAC 2004 Annual Report. Page 13 
42 EAC  2004 Annual Report. Page 5 
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In the final section of the report, which discusses the activities planned for 2005, the EAC 
acknowledges that it cannot provide guidance to the States in time to help them make wise 
choices as they procure voting systems to comply with HAVA. The Commissioners point out 
that they can only provide that guidance after the states have their new systems in place. 43 
Many States are directing efforts to meeting the January 2006 deadline  ... the Agency 
expects to receive initial recommendations for voting system standards from the TGDC 
and NIST for use in voting system procurements, laying the groundwork for future 
technical assistance to the States. 
Nevertheless, on May 10, 2005, in a response to a question from the Louisiana Secretary of State, 
the U.S. Department of Justice declared that HAVA “unambiguously requires” the states to 
have their compliant voting systems in place and ready for use in time to meet the “absolute” 
deadline of January 1, 2006. 44 
Congress, too, was complicit in this decision to force states to meet requirements that were, as 
yet, undefined by the agency tasked with defining them. The National Association of Counties 
(NACo), VotersUnite, and other organizations attempted to convince Congress to remove this 
double bind by extending the states’ deadlines, but those attempts were unsuccessful.45  
With no federal guidance on how to meet the requirements of HAVA, the states began 
purchasing new systems, relying almost wholly on the voting system vendors’ assurance that 
their systems were HAVA-compliant. It wasn’t until July 20, 2005 — less than six months 
before the states’ new, HAVA-compliant systems had to be in place and ready for use — that 
the EAC provided, in the form of a 4-page advisory, minimal guidance on how to determine if a 
voting system meets the HAVA requirements.46  
The massive breakdowns and other problems that occurred in the 2006 primary elections across 
the country demonstrate the result of the federal government’s insistence on requiring the cart 
before the horse.47 
 
                                                     
43 EAC 2004 Annual Report. Page 30 
44 http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/lavotsyst.htm 
45 Letter to U.S. Senate and House Committees on Appropriations. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/HAVADeadlineLetter.pdf 
46 EAC Advisory 2005-004: How to determine if a voting system is compliant with Section 301(a) – a gap analysis 
between 2002 Voting System Standards and the requirements of Section 301(a). 
http://www.eac.gov/election/docs/eac-20advisory-2005-004301a.pdf/attachment_download/file 
47 http://www.votersunite.org/info/trainwreck.asp 
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States Escalate Dependence on Vendors. 
Mandates and decisions of state and local legislators and election officials facilitate the 
vendors’ ability to undermine elections.  
Legislators and election officials — motivated by the need to quickly comply with federal law, 
concerned about losing millions in federal grants, threatened by lawsuits from advocates for 
people with disabilities, and informed in large part by voting system vendors — took actions 
that facilitated the vendors’ undermining of elections.  
After HAVA was enacted, every state had over three years until the deadline for compliance. 
Any state (or a collaboration of states) might have commissioned experts to develop a secure, 
accessible, reliable voting system for all jurisdictions in the state to use. Such a system would 
have been fully owned by the people without any licensing fees and could have been 
maintained by technicians accountable to the state.  
Such a system would have cost a fraction of what states have paid for insecure, inaccessible, 
unreliable voting systems that have forced jurisdictions to depend on voting system vendors for 
costly maintenance, support, and upgrades. 
Such a system would not have been subject to illegal installations, contract violations, or 
deliveries of broken equipment the vendor was slow to repair. Nor would counties using such a 
system be at the mercy of vendors holding them hostage for the support on which the counties 
depend.  
But no state used the time and funding provided by HAVA to commission the development of 
an independent, state-owned voting system. 
Instead, they took action as if they were dependent on the big voting system corporations for 
turn-key products to run elections. And by those actions, the states made it so.  
Though Congress set the stage for increased dependency on vendors, lower levels of 
government are also responsible, in a variety of ways, for facilitating the vendors’ undermining 
of our election structure.  
State legislatures 
As if electronic equipment manufactured by the voting system corporations was their only 
option for HAVA-compliance, state legislatures passed laws that made such equipment the 
only realistic option for local jurisdictions. For example:  
♦ New York state law requires voting systems to include specific features of systems currently 
manufactured by the big corporations. 
§ 7-202. Voting machine or system; requirements of.  
... f. be provided with a “protective counter” which records the number of times the 
machine or system has been operated since it was built and a “public counter” which 
records separate election;48   
This provision (one of many similarly specific provisions in New York election law) 
prevents innovative solutions that might provide a better, or even a different, way of 
accomplishing the goals of “protective counters” and “public counters.”  
                                                     
48 http://www.elections.state.ny.us/NYSBOE/download/law/2006NYElectionLaw.pdf. page 203 (pdf page 231) 
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♦ Maryland law disallows independent development of a government-owned voting system:  
(a) In general.- Acquisition of a voting system shall be by purchase, lease, or rental and 
shall be exempt from State, county, or municipal taxation.49  
In an attempt to ensure the reliability of electronic voting equipment, most states passed laws 
requiring that their voting systems meet federal standards and/or be certified by the Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC). For example: 
♦ Washington State law requires (with some exceptions) that voting systems be tested and 
approved by a test lab authorized by the EAC.  
No voting device shall be approved by the secretary of state unless it: 
...(6) Except for functions or capabilities unique to this state, has been tested and 
certified by an independent testing authority designated by the United States election 
assistance commission.50  
♦ Idaho law requires approval by a test lab authorized by either NASED or the EAC: 
(1) ... In order for any voting machine or vote tally system to be certified in Idaho it 
must meet the federal election commission standards and be approved for use by an 
independent testing authority sanctioned by the national association of state election 
directors (NASED) or be certified by the federal election assistance commission.51  
Because of the high fees charged by the independent testers that determine compliance, such 
laws, in practice, prohibit the use of any voting systems other than those manufactured by 
corporations large enough to afford the expense.  
State and Local Election Officials 
Many state and local officials dismiss evidence of defective services provided by vendors and 
continue to turn to the vendors for those services. For example: 
♦ Ballot programming, which provides the means by which marks on a ballot or touches on a 
screen are translated into votes, is done separately for every election and is never subjected 
to independent testing. Even if the underlying software were error free, an error in ballot 
programming could pervert the results or even reverse the outcome of an election.   
And it has.52 In election after election, ballot programming errors cause inaccurate results. 
Dozens of such errors by ES&S alone have been reported in the news, yet hundreds of 
jurisdictions continue to pay ES&S to program their elections.  
Many election officials also dismiss voting system studies conducted by respected experts, 
consultants, and universities when those studies discredit the voting systems. These officials 
choose, instead, to rely on the assurances and claims of voting system vendors, despite the 
perennial and well-known tendency of vendors in general to present biased information about 
their products in order to make a sale and protect their reputations. For example:  
                                                     
49 § 9-105. Acquisition of voting systems.  
http://www.michie.com/maryland/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0 
50 RCW 29A.12.080. Requirements for approval. http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=29A.12.080 
51 34-2409.  Examination Of Machines By Secretary Of State Prior To Adoption. 
http://www3.state.id.us/cgi-bin/newidst?sctid=340240009.K 
52 Vote-Switching Software Provided by Vendors — A Partial List Reported in the News. Compiled by 
VotersUnite. http://www.votersunite.org/info/Vote-Switchinginthenews.pdf 
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♦ Maryland State Board of Elections, 2003-2004. The State of Maryland purchased Diebold 
touch screen systems for $55.6 million dollars, even after two expert studies — one of them 
commissioned by Maryland — declared the system to be unsuitable for use in elections.  
In July of 2003, four scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities studied the source 
code of the software used for Diebold’s tabulation equipment. Their report states: 
We conclude that this voting system is unsuitable for use in a general election.53  
Diebold responded that the researchers didn’t consider how elections officials use the 
machines in actual elections.54  
In August of 2003, Maryland was considering the purchase of Diebold’s touch screen voting 
system and hired a consulting firm (SAIC – Science Applications International Corporation) 
to analyze Diebold’s system. The firm’s report recommended 17 “mitigation strategies” for 
defects the team found. The executive summary states: 
The system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of 
compromise.55  
Diebold claimed that the report didn’t find much fault with the equipment or software, but 
that most of the criticism addressed how election workers set up and monitored the 
machines.56  
Despite the severe defects identified in the Johns Hopkins/Rice and SAIC reports, Maryland 
finalized the $55.6 million dollar purchase from Diebold.57 
A subsequent study by RABA Technologies (commissioned by Maryland in January 2004) 
also found severe defects in the Diebold system. The computer science experts who tested 
the system gave it a failing grade.58  
However, the press release from Diebold 
President Bob Urosevich said:  
The findings in the SAIC and RABA 
reports both confirm the accuracy and 
security of Maryland’s voting procedures 
and our voting systems as they exist 
today.59 
The Maryland Board of Elections accepted 
Diebold’s claims and announced:  
The findings in the SAIC and RABA 
reports both confirm the accuracy and 
security of Maryland’s voting system and 
procedures as they exist today.60 
                                                     
53 Analysis of an Electronic Voting System. July 23, 2003; By Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, 
and Dan S. Wallach. http://avirubin.com/vote/analysis/index.html 
54 Touch-Screen Voting Gets State OK, With Security Fixes. FoxNews.com. September 25, 2003. By Michael Duck. 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,98248,00.html. Archived: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=633 
55 Risk Assessment Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System and Processes. September 2, 2003; by SAIC. 
http://www.elections.state.md.us/pdf/risk_assessment_report.pdf 
56 Report critical of Diebold system. Independent study for Maryland finds voting machines have high-risk 
weaknesses. Sep. 27, 2003. Beacon Journal. By John Russell and Erika D. Smith.  
Archived at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=629 
57 New voting machines to be reviewed: General Assembly asks for its own analysis of possible vulnerability. 
Baltimore Sun. October 21, 2003. By David Nitkin. Archived: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=813 
58 E-Vote Still Flawed, Experts Say. Wired News. January 29, 2004. By Kim Zetter 
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2004/01/62109 
59 Maryland Approves Electronic Voting Machines Despite Security Flaws. The Sentinel. By Nia Davis, Staff Writer. 
http://www.thesentinel.com/286696744072607.php 
60 Response to: Department of Legislative Services Trusted Agent Report on Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting 
System. Linda H. Lamone, Administrator, Maryland State Board of Elections. January 29, 2004. 
http://mlis.state.md.us/Other/voting_system/sbe_response.pdf 
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Since the time the three reports were published, NASED has continued to approve 
Diebold’s touch screen systems, states have continued to certify them for use, and 
jurisdictions have continued to buy them — without Diebold’s ever fixing the most 
egregious defects identified in the 2004 RABA report.61  
♦ County Commissioners, Emery County, Utah, 2006. Lt. Gov. Herbert and the county 
commissioners defended Diebold and the use of the vendor’s defective equipment and 
dismissed the election director whose computer expert exposed the defects.  
Emery County Elections Director Bruce Funk had concerns about memory discrepancies he 
noticed in his newly-delivered Diebold TSx (touch screen) voting system. At the suggestion 
of Black Box Voting, he invited Finnish security expert Harri Hursti to examine the voting 
machines. Mr. Hursti found several ways in which the machines were vulnerable to vote-
manipulation — one of them particularly hazardous. He stated in his report that:  
One of them, however, seems to enable a malicious person to compromise the 
equipment even years before actually using the exploit, possibly leaving the voting 
terminal incurably compromised.62  
This flaw in the machines’ software is so severe that Dr. David Dill, Dr. Doug Jones, and 
Dr. Barbara Simons — three nationally respected computer experts who had been 
investigating such systems for years — responded with: 
We must ask, how did software containing such an outrageous violation come to be 
certified, and what other flaws, yet to be uncovered, lurk in other certified systems?63  
These scientists also noted that the defects Mr. Hursti found had been “documented in 
analysis, commissioned by Maryland and conducted by RABA Technologies,” and they 
pointed out that: 
For over two years, Diebold has chosen not to fix the security holes, and Maryland has 
chosen not to alert other states or national officials about these problems. 
But the officials didn’t thank Mr. Funk for exposing a defect that could collapse elections in 
Emery County, as well all of Utah. Nor did they demand that Diebold fix the defects or 
return the money. Nor did they sue Diebold for breach of contract or false claims. 
Instead, Lt. Gov. Herbert and the Emery County commissioners met behind closed doors 
with Diebold representatives, sided with Diebold’s criticism of Mr. Funk for testing the 
equipment, insisted on keeping and using the Diebold machines, and ultimately released 
Mr. Funk from his position. 64  
                                                     
61 The Diebold Bombshell. OpEd News. July 23, 2006. by David Dill, Doug Jones and Barbara Simons. 
http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_david_di_060723_the_diebold_bombshel.htm 
62 Diebold TSx Evaluation. SECURITY ALERT: May 11, 2006. A Black Box Voting Project. Prepared by: Harri 
Hursti. http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVtsxstudy.pdf, page 2. 
63 The Diebold Bombshell.  
64 County clerk refuses to conduct election with Diebold machines. Emery County Progress. March 2006. By PATSY 
STODDARD, Editor. http://www.ecprogress.com/print.php?tier=1&article_id=3932 and 
http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-profile.cgi?action=rate&topic=1954&page=27634&post=21457 
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Unaccountable, Untrustworthy, Overcharging, Bullying for Control 
Unaccountable 
Vendors’ contracts contain blanket disclaimers, essentially saying “We don’t warrant 
that our voting systems or services are fit for the purpose of holding elections.” 
Remarkably similar standard language in the contracts of the four major voting system vendors 
disclaim all accountability for the equipment, software, and services for counting votes. 
However, despite this contractual language, the question remains to be decided by the courts 
whether these companies are vulnerable to breach of contract claims for marketing defective 
products and services. 
Hart InterCivic. The following words in Hart InterCivic’s 2006 contract with Yolo County, 
California are typical of the warranty terms in Hart InterCivic contracts. This same 
disclaimer appears in Hart’s proposed 2005 contract with the State of Texas.  
5. Warranty Terms: ... HART DISCLAIMS ALL EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES, 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, MERCHANTABILITY, TITLE AND NONINFRINGEMENT FOR 
ALL EQUIPMENT, SOFTWARE, AND SERVICES. THE EXPRESS WARRANTIES EXTEND 
SOLELY TO CLIENT. SOME STATES (OR JURISDICTIONS) DO NOT ALLOW LIMITATIONS 
ON IMPLIED WARRANTIES, SO THE ABOVE LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO 
CLIENT.65 
Diebold. The 2006 contract between Diebold Election Systems, Inc. (DESI, now “Premier”) and 
Larimer County, Colorado gives an example of Diebold’s disclaimer. 
8.5. No Other Warranties. DESI DISCLAIMS ALL OTHER REPRESENTATIONS AND 
WARRANTIES, WHETHER WRITTEN, ORAL, EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY, 
INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND ANY WARRANTY BASED ON A COURSE OF DEALING, 
COURSE OF PERFORMANCE OR USAGE OF TRADE.66 
Sequoia. The company’s 2001 contract with Palm Beach, Florida contains language 
representative of its contracts, which essentially claims “we aren’t accountable for anything, 
even breach of this contract.” 
B. Other Warranties. ... SEQUOIA EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL OTHER WARRANTIES, 
EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, NOT SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH HEREIN, INCLUDING 
THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT WHATSOEVER SHALL SEQUOIA BE LIABLE FOR INDIRECT, 
SPECIAL OR INCONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AS A RESULT OF ITS BREACH OF ANY OF 
THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT.67 
                                                     
65 http://www.window.state.tx.us/procurement/cat_page/578-N1HarteSlateStandardAgreement.pdf, page 4.  
Also http://accurate-voting.org/contracts/CA/Yolo/CA_yolo_la_2006.pdf, page 3 
66 http://accurate-voting.org/contracts/CO/Larimer/CO_larimer_2006.pdf, page 3 
67 http://accurate-voting.org/contracts/FL/Palm_Beach/FL_palmbeach_2001.pdf, p 20,21 
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At the end of the contract with Palm Beach, Sequoia’s software license and warranty 
warrants the ROM (the hardware chip that holds the software). So, if the chip turns out to be 
unreadable, the company will furnish another ROM with the same software.  
Then, reiterating and even strengthening its previous disclaimer, Sequoia disclaims 
accountability for everything else, even the documentation, functionality, operation, and 
accuracy of the software.  
1.2 LIMITED WARRANTY 
Licensor warrants to Licensee the ROM(s) on which the Program is furnished will be 
free from defect in materials and workmanship under normal use and conditions for 
the period of the Warranty Agreement specified in the Purchase Agreement from the 
date of delivery of this software package to you as evidenced by a copy of your receipt.  
EXCEPT AS STATED ABOVE IN THIS SECTION, THE PROGRAM AND DOCUMENTATION 
ARE PROVIDED “AS IS” WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR 
IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OR [sic] 
MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. LICENSOR DOES 
NOT WARRANTY THE FUNCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE PROGRAM WILL MEET YOUR 
REQUIREMENTS OR THAT THE OPERATION OF THE PROGRAM WILL BE 
UNINTERRUPTED OR ERROR- FREE.68 
ES&S. In its 2001 contract with Sarasota County, Florida, ES&S included this disclaimer of 
accountability in its “Miscellaneous” article.  
Article 3: Miscellaneous. e. Exclusive Remedies. ... ES&S EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL 
WARRANTIES, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY SET 
FORTH IN THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY IMPLIED 
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY.69 
By 2005, ES&S had joined with the other vendors by also disclaiming “fitness for a particular 
purpose” as shown in its contract with Jefferson County, Washington. 
Article 3: Miscellaneous. e. Exclusive Remedies. ... ES&S EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL 
WARRANTIES, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY SET 
FORTH IN THIS AGREEMENT, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.70 
 
                                                     
68 http://accurate-voting.org/contracts/FL/Palm_Beach/FL_palmbeach_2001.pdf, pg 163 
69 http://accurate-voting.org/contracts/FL/Sarasota/FL_sarasota_2001.pdf, page 7,8 
70 http://accurate-voting.org/contracts/WA/Jefferson/WA_jefferson_2005.pdf, page 5. 
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Untrustworthy.  
The corporations controlling our elections have long histories of unethical, deceitful, and 
even illegal behavior.  
Gary L. Greenhalgh, who served with the Federal Election Commission from 1975 to 1985 as 
director of the FEC clearinghouse on election administration and the office of information, said: 
Voting machines are different from other things bought by a government. 
In purchasing voting equipment, election officials must rely heavily on the integrity, 
honesty and reliability of the vendor selling them this equipment.71 
Entrusting our elections — and thus our democracy — to private corporations would be 
reckless, even if those corporations had proven track records of competence, integrity, and 
ethical behavior. But information easily within reach in the public domain shows that 
corporations controlling our elections have long histories of unethical, deceitful, and even illegal 
behavior.  
Entrusting our elections to untrustworthy corporations is beyond reckless. 
In a 2007 investigation into how well the voting system vendors attempting to sell equipment to 
New York State (Diebold, ES&S, and Sequoia) complied with the state’s requirements for 
“responsible contractors,” the author found that none of the vendors met the criteria.72 The 
information that follows summarizes a small sampling of the findings that are explained in 
more detail in that report and includes findings about Hart InterCivic as well as Microvote, a 
company with a smaller market share. 
Diebold Election Systems, Inc.  
Formal Complaints. December 13, 2005. A Securities Fraud Class Action suit was filed against 
Diebold, Inc. naming eight top executive officers in the company as co-defendants. The suit 
was filed by plaintiff Janice Konkol, alleging securities fraud against the North Canton, 
Ohio-based manufacturer of voting systems and ATM machines on behalf of investors who 
owned shares of Diebold stock and lost money due to an alleged fraudulent scheme by the 
company and its executives to deceive shareholders during the “class period” of October 22, 
2003 through September 21, 2005.73  
In the first quarter of 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission began an informal 
investigation and converted it to a formal investigation in the second quarter. As of March 
31, 2006, there were 10 outstanding lawsuits against Diebold, charging SEC violations.74 On 
October 20, 2006, several pending lawsuits were consolidated.75  
                                                     
71 FBI Talks to Ex-Shoup Exec; Voting Machine Testimony Resumes. July 11, 1990. BY: Terry Keeter; The 
Commercial Appeal. Archived at: http://www.madcowprod.com/shoupshoupadupe.htm. 
72 Voting System Companies Fail to Meet New York State’s Requirements for “Responsible Contractors.” July 10, 
2007. by Ellen Theisen, VotersUnite.Org. http://www.votersunite.org/info/IrresponsibleVendors.pdf. 
Note: Liberty Election Systems was included in the 2007 study, but is not mentioned in this one since none of its 
equipment is currently installed in the United States. See also two letters to New York State officials from Andi 
Novick, Esq.http://www.votersunite.org/info/VendorsProhibited.pdf and  
http://www.votersunite.org/info/UpdatedVendorIrresponsibility807.pdf 
73 http://securities.stanford.edu/1035/DBD05_01/20051213_f01c_052873.pdf 
74 http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/28823/000095015206004170/l19791ae10vq.htm#111 
75 http://www.milbergweiss.com/files/tbl_s47Details%5CFileUpload265%5C228%5CDieboldLPDecision.pdf 
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Civil Fines and Injunctions Imposed by Governmental Agencies. Alameda County, 
California. March, 2005. Diebold paid $2.6 million to settle a false claims lawsuit filed by 
private citizens, Alameda County, and the California Attorney General.  
A Qui Tam false claims lawsuit was filed against Diebold Election Systems on behalf of 
Alameda County, California by Bev Harris, Executive Director of Black Box Voting, and Jim 
March, a board member of Black Box Voting.  
In September, 2004, California’s Attorney General Bill Lockyer joined in the false claims suit, 
saying that he was suing Diebold over fraudulent claims he believes the company has made 
with regards to their electronic voting machines. In November 2004, Diebold announced its 
intent to settle, and the case was formally settled in March 2005, calling for Diebold to pay a 
total of $2.6 million. 76 
Hiring Key Personnel With Criminal Convictions. Seattle, Washington. December 2003. 
Investigative journalist Bev Harris announced her discovery that a Diebold programmer, 
Jeffrey Dean, had been convicted of stealing money by tampering with computer records. 
According to a public court document released before Diebold hired him, Dean served time 
in a Washington state correctional facility for stealing money and tampering with computer 
files in a scheme that “involved a high degree of sophistication and planning.”77 
Less than Satisfactory Performance. 1998 through July 2008. Failures of hundreds of Diebold 
machines were reported in the news across the United States. A partial list includes such 
problems as tabulation errors, vote-switching on electronic voting machines, malfunctioning 
voter access cards, breakdowns on election day, paper jams, data transfer failures, and 
excessively high undervotes (ballots failing to register a vote).78 
Election Systems & Software (ES&S) 
Violations of State Laws, Civil Fines and Injunctions, Ethical Violations. March, 2004. 
Indiana. The election commission discovered that ES&S had installed an uncertified version 
of firmware in the iVotronic electronic voting machines in four counties. When confronted, 
representatives agreed to reinstall the certified version. Then the commission learned that 
the certified version didn’t tabulate the votes correctly, so they allowed the use of the 
uncertified version but required ES&S to put up a $10 million bond to insure against 
problems and lawsuits. Election Commissioner Brian Burdick, said: 79 
I just think I was absolutely lied to by your CEO and I’m more than on the slow burn 
about it. I sat in this room and you all lied to me. 
In April of 2004, specifically in response to this unethical behavior of ES&S, the Indiana 
State legislature passed a law providing penalties for voting machine vendors who act on 
their own initiative without the permission of the state. 80 
                                                     
76 Attorney General Lockyer Announces $2.6 Million Settlement with Diebold in Electronic Voting Lawsuit. 
Attorney General’s November 10, 2004 Press Release. http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=843 
77 Con Job at Diebold Subsidiary. Wired News. December 17, 2003. by AP. 
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,61640,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_3 
78 Diebold in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures. Compiled by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/Dieboldinthenews.pdf and the online problem log, maintained by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp 
79 Election Commission Bails Out Voting Machine Maker In Time for May Primary. March 11, 2004; 
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=1529 
80 Penalties Established for Voting Machine Companies That Don’t Deliver. April 14, 2004; 
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=1846 
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In August of 2005, Indiana imposed severe economic penalties on ES&S when the company, 
once again, installed uncertified software in Marion County’s voting systems. ES&S paid the 
county  $1.2 million to settle a lawsuit. 81 
Breach of Contract. April, 2006. Oregon. Secretary of State Bradbury sued ES&S for breach of 
contract and nullified the contract. Secretary Bradbury said: 82 
We will not leave our elections in the hands of companies that do not follow through 
on their obligations, and we will not be coerced into altering our contracts. 
The suit was settled out of court, with ES&S compensating the state in tabulating 
equipment.83 (See page 48 for the alternative Oregon developed.) 
Formal Complaints Filed by Governmental Agencies. May 2006. West Virginia. Secretary of 
State Betty Ireland filed a formal complaint against ES&S regarding its poor performance. 
The state’s press release said, in part: 84  
ES&S’s delays in programming ballots for the new electronic voting machines placed 
great hardship on state and county election officials in getting ready for the May 9th 
Primary Election. 
Less than Satisfactory Performance. 1996 through July 2008. Dozens of reports of ES&S 
equipment failures were in the news across the United States. A partial list (over 100 
reports) includes such problems as ballot programming errors that affected outcomes, vote-
flipping on selection screens and review screens, breakdowns on election day, battery 
failures, vote counts that reached 32,000 and began decreasing, malfunctioning vote data 
cartridges, contests that failed to appear on computer ballots, screen freezes, data transfer 
failures, electronic ballots irretrievably lost, excessive and unexplainable undervote rates.85 
Sequoia Voting Systems 
Criminal Indictments/ Convictions of Key Personnel. David Philpot, Sequoia’s exclusive agent 
in Louisiana, was convicted of bribery in a 1999 kickback scandal. Phil Foster, a Sequoia 
salesman indicted in 2001 by a grand jury for related crimes, had been granted immunity for 
his testimony in the scandal and was not tried. Foster has since risen in the company and at 
present is serving as the Vice President Administration & Strategies.86 He served on the 
Palm Beach County Election Technology Advisory Committee, from September 2005 
through May 2006 and continues to advise the county’s elections supervisor.87   
                                                     
81 Team 4 Investigates Electronic Voting. WTAE-TV. February 17, 2006. 
http://www.thepittsburghchannel.com/news/7161565/detail.html, and  
County struggles with voting quandary. Daily Journal News. May 14th, 2004. By Bryan Corbin. 
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=2095 
82 http://www.sos.state.or.us/executive/pressreleases/2006/0420.html (press release) 
http://www.votetrustusa.org/pdfs/Oregon/Oregon_ESSComplaint_041906.pdf (lawsuit) 
83 Related to the author by Gene Newton, Oregon’s HAVA program director. 
84 http://www.wvsos.com/pressoffice/historical/051006essproblems.pdf (Press Release) 
Ireland Files Complaint Over Voting Machines: Vendor ES&S blamed for causing hardships for counties. State 
Journal. May 10, 2006. By Jack Kane. http://www.statejournal.com/story.cfm?func=viewstory&storyid=10786 
85 ES&S in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures. Compiled by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/ES&Sinthenews.pdf and the online problem log, maintained by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp 
86 Exec’s indictment hits Oakland vote firm. San Francisco Business Times. November 16, 2001. John Rhine. 
http://sanfrancisco.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/stories/2001/11/19/story4.html 
87 Palm Beach County Election Technology Advisory Committee Meeting Minutes. September 15, 2005 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/PBC_ETAC_Meeting_Minutes.pdf and  
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Ethical Violations. November 2002. Bernalillo County, New Mexico. Vice President Howard 
Cramer failed to inform New Mexico officials of a known software bug that tabulated votes 
incorrectly. The Albuquerque Tribune reported:88   
Although about 48,000 people had voted early on 212 Sequoia-supplied touch-screen 
computers at six sites in the county, the initial figures given to the commissioners 
indicated that no race - not even for governor - showed a total of more than about 
36,000 votes.  
Sequoia admitted that the same error had been encountered in Clark County, Nevada, 
several weeks earlier, but Sequoia had not informed the election officials in Bernalillo 
County.  
Ethical Violations. November 2006. Denver. After Sequoia’s electronic pollbook system caused 
chaos in the general election, Sequoia’s Vice President Howard Cramer lied to the mayor’s 
panel in an attempt to blame the election commissioners for Sequoia’s failure.  
Cramer attempted to convince the mayor’s panel that the software Sequoia developed for 
Denver was not intended as an electronic pollbook, but documents proved that Sequoia had 
been commissioned to build software precisely for that purpose.89  
Less than Satisfactory Performance. 1996 through July 2008. Dozens of reports of Sequoia 
equipment failures were reported in the news across the United States. A partial list 
includes such problems as votes dropped on touch screen systems, screen freezes, 
tabulation errors, vote-switching on electronic voting machines, breakdowns on election 
day, contests failing to appear on computer ballots, paper jams, data transfer failures, 
malfunctioning vote data cartridges, battery failures, and software that lost votes during 
tabulation.90  
Hart InterCivic 
Hart InterCivic was not mentioned in the 2007 study, since it was not actively marketing in 
New York State at the time. However, evidence shows that it, too, falls short of accepted 
criteria for “responsible contractors.” 
Ethical Violations. In mid-2004, William Singer, a former technical specialist with Hart 
InterCivic, wrote letters to the Texas and Ohio Secretaries of State, warning them of 
fraudulent claims and misrepresentations committed by Hart InterCivic.  
                                                                                                                                                                           
Palm Beach County Election Technology Advisory Committee Final Report. August 23, 2006. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/PBC_ETAC finalreport.pdf, and 
County commissioner calls for inquiry into ‘mishaps and irregularities in vote tabulation’,  
South Florida Sun-Sentinel, July 3, 2008, by Josh Hafenbrack 
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/local/palmbeach/sfl-0703countyvotes,0,6840356.story,  
Archived at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7813 
88 Election results certified after software blamed. Albequerque Tribune; November 19, 2002; By Frank Zoretich, 
Tribune Reporter. http://www.abqtrib.com/archives/news02/111902_news_vote.shtml 
89 City asked for pollbook software; Documents refute vendor. December 1, 2006. Denver Post. By George Merritt. 
http://www.denverpost.com/extremes/ci_4752696. Archived at  http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=6922 
90 Sequoia in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures. Compiled by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/Sequoiainthenews.pdf and online problem log, maintained by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp 
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When neither Secretary responded, Mr. Singer wrote to them again, and again they did not 
respond. So, in 2006, Mr. Singer filed a federal false claims lawsuit (Qui Tam), “...to recover 
penalties and damages arising from false statements Hart made regarding the accuracy, 
testing, reliability, and security of its voting system,...”91  
The lawsuit remained sealed until March 2008, when the U.S. Attorney’s office decided it 
would not join Singer in the litigation. In July 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
“Rockwell Intl Corp. v. U.S.” made it financially prohibitive for Mr. Singer and his law firm 
(Levin Papantonio Thomas Mitchell Echsner & Proctor, P.A ) to continue the suit.92 
Less than Satisfactory Performance. 1996 through July 2008. Dozens of reports of Hart 
InterCivic’s equipment failures were reported in the news across the United States. A partial 
list includes problems such as machine breakdowns causing thousands of voters to be 
disenfranchised, ballots accepted by the machine before the voter voted, machines 
presenting choices for parties with no candidates, machines failing to present all the 
candidates on the screen, candidates’ names truncated on the screen, vote-switching, screen 
freezes, default selection for President, failure to read paper ballots, paper ballots scanned 
incorrectly, inability to handle high volume of write-in votes, ballot programming errors, 
and one machine that began literally smoking during an election.93  
Microvote 
Microvote has only a minor share of the voting machine industry. However, it is notable that 
the history of this vendor is replete with instances of untrustworthy behavior. 
Civil Fines. Montgomery County, Pennsylvania sued Microvote after the machines 
malfunctioned in elections in 1994 and 1995. The attorney’s press release gives more details.  
The County contended that the voting system malfunctioned after the voting machines 
shut down randomly and unpredictably as a result of their microcomputer chips 
sensing internal power surges emitted by the motors that scrolled the ballot pages. This 
resulted in long lines, in voters leaving polling stations before they voted, and in lost 
votes. In addition, after the polls closed, the software malfunctioned when counting 
the votes, causing Microvote employees to report the wrong results to the media.94  
The press release also states that the jury returned a verdict against Microvote and 
Westchester Fire Insurance Company in excess of $1,048,500. An appellate court upheld the 
verdict.  
Violations of State Laws. In July 2007, Microvote was fined $350,000 in civil penalties and 
investigative costs for 198 violations of Indiana election law after it was discovered that 
MicroVote sold and installed uncertified equipment without functions required by Indiana 
State election law.95  
                                                     
91 http://www.bradblog.com/Docs/Singer_v_HartInterCivic_OriginalComplaint.pdf 
92 Whistleblower: Voting Machine Company Lied to Election Officials About Reliability of Machines. Wired Blog 
Network. March 27, 2008. By Kim Zetter. http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/03/whistleblower-v.html 
and http://www.bradblog.com/?p=2544 and http://www.bradblog.com/?cat=364 
93 Hart InterCivic in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures. Compiled by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/Hartinthenews.pdf and online problem log, maintained by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp 
94 Elliott Greenleaf Wins in U.S. Court of Appeals, Affirming Multi-Million Dollar Settlement and Jury Verdict. 
Law Offices of Elliott Reihner & Siedzikowski, P.C. July 20, 2003. http://www.elliottreihner.com/July2003-1.html 
95 Company fined for election violations. IndyStar.com. July 27, 2007. By Mary Beth Schneider 
http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7182 
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In spring of 2004, WISH TV in Indianapolis conducted an interview with executives from 
Microvote, whose voting systems were used in Pennsylvania, Indiana, and North Carolina. 
Information from that interview reveals more about the untrustworthiness of the company’s 
executives and other personnel.96  
Criminal Indictments/ Convictions of Key Personnel.  
I-Team: Tell us about Mecklenberg County, North Carolina, a federal investigation 
and federal indictments against the county’s election administrator and MicroVote 
salesman Ed O’Day. He was convicted of bribery and kickbacks made over a seven-
year period, according to stories in the Charlotte Observer. 
Ries Jr. [President of MicroVote]: Ed O’Day was an independent agent of MicroVote – 
not a direct employee but a manufacturer’s representative for our product in North 
and South Carolina. He was convicted of bribing a public official, something we had 
no knowledge of, nor did we have any input. Unfortunately he’s still out selling 
equipment to election officials, which surprised us all.  
Ethical Violations.  
I-Team: What about Gary Greenhalgh, a former Federal Election Commission official 
who was your national sales director. You sued him in 1997. Why? 
Ries Jr.: Gary Greenhalgh, on the other hand, was a direct employee. Trade secret 
violations there. Probably the most damaging, he was actually selling the equipment 
being released from Montgomery County to our customers on the side. And it violated 
his working contract with us that he was selling outside of MicroVote’s jurisdiction. 
Note: As of September, 2004 Gary Greenhalgh became Vice President of ES&S.97 
Less than Satisfactory Performance. 1994 through July 2008. In addition to breakdowns and 
malfunctions, newspapers reported that Microvote equipment failed to tabulate votes 
correctly in these eleven counties:98  
Montgomery County, Pennsylvania (1995, 1996) 
Putnam County, Tennessee (2002) 
Boone County, Indiana (2003) 
Grant County, Indiana (2004) 
Jasper County, South Carolina (2004) 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina (2004) 
Pender County, North Carolina (2004) 
Sumner County, Tennessee (2005) 
Grant County, Indiana (2006) 
Delaware County, Indiana (2006) 
Lake County, Indiana (2006, 2007) 
                                                     
96 An I-Team 8 Investigation: Excerpts from Interviews with MicroVote Executives, WISH TV 8 I-Team, By Rick 
Dawson and Loni Smith McKown, March 2004. http://www.wishtv.com/Global/story.asp?S=1647598 
Archived at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7814 
97 http://www.cabellcounty.org/minutes/2004/MIN%209-9-04.htm 
98 Microvote in the News — A Partial List of Documented Failures. Compiled by VotersUnite. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/MicroVoteinthenews.pdf and online problem log, maintained by VotersUnite. 
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Gouging Made Easy: “they already bought the system.” 
As local elections become more dependent on vendor support, the vendors charge 
exorbitant prices. 
While HAVA paid for much of the initial cost of new voting systems, local governments are left 
on their own to pay for annual license fees, maintenance agreements, services, and upgrades 
required for the systems they already bought.  
Diebold Internal Communications.  
A normally unstated policy that appears to be adopted by all the voting system vendors is 
clearly, if offensively, expressed in a January 3, 2003 internal Diebold email sent by Ken 
Clark, principal engineer for Diebold Election Systems (now “Premier”) and later made 
publicly available on the Internet. Mr. Clark was responding to a then-recent University of 
Maryland study of the Diebold equipment and the idea of adding voter-verifiable paper 
record (“receipt”) printers to each Diebold machine in Maryland. 99 
Mr. Clark’s initial internal email read (highlighting in the original):  
There is an important point that seems to be missed by all these articles: they already 
bought the system. At this point they are just closing the barn door. Let’s just hope that 
as a company we are smart enough to charge out the yin if they try to change the rules 
now and legislate voter receipts. 
When asked to clarify the meaning of “out the yin”, Mr. Clark wrote further:  
Short for ‘out the yin-yang’. ... 
Any after-sale changes should be prohibitively expensive. Much more expensive than, 
for example, a university research grant. 
Webster County, Iowa.  
On-going fees charged by ES&S have doubled the cost of elections. In 2005, the county 
budgeted $49,000 for elections, but in 2007 the cost skyrocketed to $110,700 for only 29 
precincts and 25,300 registered voters. According to County Auditor Carol Messerly the 
increase was primarily because of the maintenance contracts for the new optical scanners 
and ballot-marking devices.100 At this point, the county saw no realistic alternative to paying 
the exorbitant costs of maintenance since they had already bought the system. 
                                                     
99 ‘Gouging’ memo leaves Diebold red-faced: Paper trail? Sure, that’ll be $1200 for a printer 
The Register. December 16, 2003. By Andrew Orlowski in San Francisco. 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/12/16/gouging_memo_leaves_diebold_redfaced/, and  
E-mail stolen from Diebold is a call to gouge Maryland.  
The Gazette. December 10, 2003 by Steven T. Dennis, Staff Writer. 
http://www.gazette.net/200350/princegeorgescty/state/192070-1.html 
Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7803 
The email exchange can be found at: 
http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/~ping/diebold/lists/support.w3archive/200301/msg00015.html 
100 Webster County auditor: Election changes coming. The Messenger. July 16, 2008. By Bill Shea. 
http://www.messengernews.net/page/content.detail/id/507428.html?nav=5010. 
Article archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7790. 
Precinct information at http://www.sos.state.ia.us/pdfs/elections/CoVoteSystem.pdf 
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Ohio.  
In early 2006, after 47 counties in Ohio had already bought the system from Diebold Election 
Systems, Inc., Diebold offered to sell service coverage for the AccuVote touch-screen 
machines the counties had purchased.  
In March 2006, the Columbus Dispatch reported that, “The cost of service contracts for new 
touch screen voting machines has left county elections officials across Ohio in sticker 
shock.” The state had a five-year warranty contract for the equipment itself. The service 
contract at issues was additional — for technical service and support only.101  
The table below gives the examples the newspaper quoted for a one-year service warranty 
offered by Diebold Election Systems to service its touch-screen voting machines. The table 
also shows the number of registered voters in each county and the turnout in the November 
2006 election.102 The cost per registered voter for the full service contract for just one year is 
a cost that must be added onto the cost of administering an election: 
County Full Partial-1 Partial-2 Reg Voters ‘06 Turnout Cost/Voter 
Holmes $50,000 $35,000 $15,000 18,206 8,639 $2.74 
Perry $50,000 $35,000 $15,000 21,260 13,368 $2.35 
Fairfield  $90,000 $60,000 $21,000 96,593 55,657 $0.93 
Montgomery $110,000   375,610 219,153 $0.29 
“It just about blew our minds away,” said Alice Nicolia, director of the [Fairfield] 
county Board of Elections.  
In Perry County, the Diebold service contract would cost two and a half times as much per 
voter as in Fairfield County.  
“We just do not have the money,” said Janie DePinto, elections board director. 
Holmes County officials, too, were in shock.  
“This completely blind-sided the county,” said Ray Feikert, a Holmes County 
commissioner in northeastern Ohio. “It’s kind of a back-door expense that no one saw 
coming.”  
Steven Harsman, president of the Ohio Association of Election Officials and director of the 
Montgomery County Board of Elections, understood the difficulty of running an election on 
new, complicated, unfamiliar electronic equipment. He pointed out how Diebold now had 
the counties over a barrel: 
“The irony is that the small counties will have a bigger need for these contracts, but 
they won’t have the money to pay for them,” Harsman said. “Elections boards are 
going to county commissioners, and commissioners are kicking and screaming. It’s not 
a pretty situation at all. But when the dust settles, a high percentage of counties are 
going to need this, and county commissioners are going to have to find the funding.” 
                                                     
101 Voting machine support costly. Elections boards and counties stunned by expense; state aid for training ends 
after primary. THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH. March 05, 2006. By Mary Beth Lane. 
http://www.columbusdispatch.com/live/contentbe/dispatch/2006/03/05/20060305-C1-00.html 
Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=6560 
102 Voter Turnout and Registration for the November 2006 election are from: 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2006ElectionsResults/06-1107turnout.aspx 
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Our Way or the Highway.  
When threatened, vendors exert claims of proprietary control to bring independent 
election officials back into line.  
Although voting system vendors control many aspects of public elections, they are not 
obligated to respond to open records requests. Insisting that their systems are protected by 
trade secret laws, they aggressively resist independent investigations, relenting only when state 
laws require it. In Florida, three vendors cooperated in using HAVA deadlines to gain control 
over an election official who defied them and independently tested one of their systems.  
Leon County, Florida, 2005. Ion Sancho, Supervisor of Elections, authorized two computer 
experts to test the county’s Diebold equipment. The tests were arranged by Black Box Voting 
and conducted by Florida computer scientist Dr. Herbert Thompson and Finnish security expert 
Harri Hursti. Both tests showed that the system could easily be manipulated to report 
inaccurate results, without detection:103 Mr. Sancho said, in part:  
Granted the same access as an employee of our office, it was possible to enter the 
computer, alter election results, and exit the system without leaving any physical 
record of this action. ... It was also demonstrated that false information or instructions 
could be placed on a memory card ... and create false results or election reports.104 
Mr. Sancho began to look elsewhere for the voting equipment his county needed to comply 
with the HAVA’s accessibility requirement, but the only other vendors (ES&S and Sequoia) 
with equipment certified for use in Florida refused to do business with Leon County. The 
county was required by federal law to purchase accessible equipment immediately. 
Diebold was the only option remaining. In a February 27 meeting held by the county 
commissioners with Diebold and without Mr. Sancho, Diebold refused to sell any more 
equipment to Leon County because of the “unauthorized testing” Mr. Sancho had conducted.105 
In March, Florida’s then-Attorney General Charlie Crist promised to investigate possible anti-
trust violations by the three vendors, but failed to carry through on the investigation.  
Also in March, Mr. Sancho proposed to agree that he would not test any Diebold equipment 
unless Diebold “gave permission” and could participate in the testing.106 Diebold agreed. In 
April, the county signed a contract to purchase Diebold’s DREs. The contract explicitly prevents 
Mr. Sancho from hiring experts to conduct independent investigation of the system. 
4.5 Customer will not allow third parties who are not employees of Customer, or 
authorized DESI Technicians access to the System for purposes of inspection, testing, 
review or evaluation.107  
                                                     
103 Florida: Ion Sancho Fights Back. March 08, 2006. By Susan Pynchon, Florida Fair Elections Coalition. 
http://votetrustusa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1015&Itemid=113, and  
http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/15595.html, and 
the video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PiiaBqwqkXs, from 1:15 to 5:42. 
104 Rep. McKinney (D-GA) Discusses Hack as Diebold Attacks Elections Official. By: Matthew Cardinale. 
YubaNet. Jun 27, 2005. Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=5611 
105 Board of [Leon] County Commissioners. Tuesday, February 28, 2006 Meeting - Follow-Up Memo 
http://www.leoncountyfl.gov/ADMIN/Agenda/all.asp?id=309 
106 Board of [Leon] County Commissioners. Tuesday, March 28, 2006 Meeting - Follow-Up Memo 
http://www.leoncountyfl.gov/ADMIN/Agenda/all.asp?id=315, see video at 2:45. 
107 http://accurate-voting.org/contracts/FL/Leon/FL_leon_2006.pdf, page 3. 
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What Can be Done 
Case Study of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. 
With training and knowledge, and despite ES&S’s repeated attempts to undermine the 
election structure, the election director oversees the goods and services of the vendor.  
In January, 2006, Luzerne County received an ultimatum from the state: upgrade the voting 
system before the May 16 primary election or lose the $3 million in federal funding the county 
needs to comply with HAVA.108 The county election board immediately and unanimously 
decided to purchase new voting systems from ES&S — before the final purchase price was even 
negotiated.109 
Negotiations began and ES&S agreed to deliver 750 voting machines and the training needed to 
use them, but in mid-March, just two months before the May 16 primary, ES&S abruptly backed 
out of the agreement.110 
Talks stumbled when Piazza [the county election director] began to push the company 
for details about the cost of extended warranties and service arrangements, among 
other issues. 
“When I asked about it, I was told we could talk about that later,” Piazza said, adding 
he had a bad gut feeling there was an attempt to “keep information from our county.” 
“It wasn’t something that I wanted to talk about later. It was something that I wanted 
to talk about now.” 
Given the exorbitant costs ES&S was known to charge for warranties, service, and maintenance, 
Mr. Piazza attempted to settle the costs ahead of time. But ES&S had other intentions.  
With the ultimatum from the state and the $3 million that hung in the balance, the county was 
in a time crunch. Eventually, “after letters from the county’s attorneys,” ES&S agreed to provide 
316 machines in time for the May 16 election — more than 400 short of the order.111 
The $2.4 million contract included 750 iVotronic voting machines (the rest to be delivered in 
time for the November 2006 election), the training needed to operate them, and a one-year 
warranty for the equipment. But ES&S representatives repeatedly refused to discuss warranty 
arrangements for future years.  
A year after the original purchase, once the warranty had expired, ES&S insisted that the county 
was contractually obligated to purchase a three-year extended warranty for a total cost of 
around $300,000. Mr. Piazza balked. On July 19, 2007, he wrote a letter to the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth and the State Bureau of Commissions, Elections and Legislation. In the letter, 
                                                     
108 County gets vote machine ultimatum: Federal funds will be lost if electronic models not ready for May 
primary, state says. Knight Ridder/Tribune Business News. January 25, 2006. 
http://news.manta.com/articles/description/2006010018000531-0304 
109 County election board unanimous on selection of electronic voting machine. CitizensVoice.com February 1, 
2006. BY James Conmy Staff Writer. Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7794. 
110 Voting machine talks break down. The Citizen’s Voice. March 15, 2006 By Tom Long.  
http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=6552 
111 Luzerne County gets ready for electronic voting. CitizensVoice.com. March 31, 2006. By Tom Long Staff Writer. 
http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7793 
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Mr. Piazza requested financial aid to pay for the maintenance that ES&S claimed he was 
obligated to purchase.  
Mr. Piazza wrote that his county had been “at the zero hour” for delivery and ES&S was still 
refusing to discuss future costs. It appears that ES&S used a deadline to its advantage and later 
misled the county into believing it was obligated to purchase an extended warranty when, in 
fact, it was not. Mr. Piazza also pointed out that these tactics, which ES&S uses to mine the 
taxpayers, are not unique to Luzerne County. He wrote, in part (highlighting added):  
Our county’s five-year plan for economic stability and continued growth unfortunately 
holds no room for the kind of expense that ES&S is all but demanding we pay. Further, 
the encumbrance of $300,000 is not one that the county had any opportunity to 
consider at the time of the mandated switch to electronic voting. That is not to say, 
however, we did not try. We asked for ... the details of an extended warranty as early 
as the State of Ohio in March of 2006. We were told by the vendors at that time, 
especially ES&S, that there would be sufficient time to talk about warranty 
arrangements after the system was in place. We were at the zero-hour when the system 
was finally delivered and were again told that the warranty coverage could be 
negotiated by the county when time permitted. Today, however, that is not the case. 
The fact is, ES&S refuses to lower the pricing structure, is unwilling to restructure the 
coverage plan to meet the needs of the counties and ES&S has not answered our 
repeated requests for the exact terms and conditions of the extended warranty plan. 
As it turns out, ES&S misleads its customers in the Commonwealth, and judging from 
conversations with other election directors at a recent election officials’ conference in 
Portland, Oregon—other jurisdictions as well. 
In addition to not being able to meet the financial burden that ES&S is asking us to 
meet, we cannot individually deal with such a large, multi-national corporation and 
the mix of deception this company promulgates and respectfully ask the 
Commonwealth, specifically, the Department of State, for its leadership in insuring 
that the voting-system vendors doing business here do not have the opportunity to 
threaten a democratic process with such unsavory business practices that vendors, 
such as ES&S, seemingly have a deep commitment to employing.112 
In a July 2008 interview with Mr. Piazza, the author learned that subsequently, he discovered 
that the contract he signed with ES&S — as opposed to the new contract ES&S was asking him 
to sign — did NOT obligate the county to purchase any extended warranty at all. This left Mr. 
Piazza free to decide how much support he wanted to purchase from ES&S and how much of 
the maintenance and support he and his staff would provide.  
Mr. Piazza decided to purchase minimal support. Instead of paying ES&S over $100,000 a year 
to do what he and his staff can do with greater expertise, Mr. Piazza has a contract to pay ES&S 
$17,300 a year for two maintenance/support services:113  
♦ Hardware maintenance for the M-650 optical scanners used to tabulate absentee ballots. 
This includes such mechanical tasks as cleaning, calibrating, ensuring the sensors are 
working correctly and the speed is correct. 
♦ Software technical support, which includes consultation over the phone.  
                                                     
112 http://www.votersunite.org/info/LuzerneCountyPA_ESS_LetterToDeptOfState_071907.pdf 
113 Breaking News: Elections bureau finalizes warranty deal for voting machines. Citizen’s Voice. October 16, 2007. 
By Michael P. Buffer, CitizensVoice Staff Writer. Archived at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=7335. 
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Mr. Piazza’s staff performs the same 14-point inspection process on the iVotronic e-voting 
machines that ES&S would have charged additional high costs to do under the company’s 
expensive “Gold Plan.” Thus, Mr. Piazza said he is confident that the work is being performed 
more carefully and with more knowledge and attention than if it were done by ES&S 
technicians — and at a much lower cost. 
During the interview with the author, Mr. Piazza stated that he would never pay ES&S for 
firmware maintenance or firmware updates, since updates are only needed when the original 
firmware is flawed. He said he would take ES&S to court before he would pay the company 
to correct its own mistakes. 
He also pointed out a few other ways in which he maintains responsibility for his own election 
structure, in spite of ES&S’s attempts to take control.  
♦ The assistance of ES&S technicians is not welcome in the elections office, or even in the 
county, during an election. Mr. Piazza has trained himself and his staff thoroughly, and — 
after allowing ES&S election-day support in prior elections — he now knows that his 
personnel are significantly more capable of using the ERM system to retrieve results and of 
providing troubleshooting in the field than the per diem technicians ES&S hires on contract 
and quickly trains.  
♦ Mr. Piazza’s staff pre-codes all the ballot definitions, ensuring that the data is correct before 
sending it to ES&S for the final phase of ballot programming. Then his staff carefully proofs 
ES&S’ work to find any errors that either ES&S or the county may have made. As a result, 
he feels confident in the ballots and ballot programming because he has not simply handed 
responsibility over to ES&S. When asked why he sends it to ES&S at all (since he mentioned 
that he does know how to do the final phase), he said, “because if anything goes wrong, I 
don’t want the company to be able to blame my county, as they have a tendency to do.”  
♦ Though he pays ES&S to create the test deck of ballots for the optical scanner, he and his 
staff spot-check them and also add some ballots of their own. He said he’s happy to pay 
ES&S to hand-mark the thousands of ballots needed for a test deck rather than have his own 
staff spend their time on that job.  
♦ Once the county receives the ballot programming back, they — not ES&S — burn the media 
for use in the election.  
♦ After the election, he analyzes the results carefully, with charts and graphs, to see if the 
individual precinct results make sense — checking for precincts wildly different from 
previous elections or from what is expected, excessive undervotes, and any other anomalies 
that would suggest a ballot programming error or counting flaw.  
Driven by the need to comply with federal and state law and by the dearth of available 
solutions, Luzerne County chose to depend on ES&S for equipment and ballot programming to 
administer elections. But Mr. Piazza has shed additional dependence by training himself and 
his staff to perform tasks other jurisdictions hand off to their vendors. As a result, Mr. Piazza is 
using ES&S rather than being used by them.  
Because the structure of his elections is not dependent on the vendor’s support, he is freer to 
challenge them when necessary, criticize them when appropriate, and even take them to court if 
need be.  
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Case Study of Oklahoma.  
The Secretary of the State Board of Elections bought the equipment and kicked the vendor 
out of the state.  
Michael Clingman, Secretary of the Oklahoma Board of Elections, testified at an Election 
Assistance Commission hearing on June 3, 2004. Excerpts from his testimony describe the 
system that had been in use for thirteen years (now seventeen years):  
In 1990 and 1991 Oklahoma created and implemented the Oklahoma Election 
Management System.  
... It integrates our statewide voter database with voting devices and training of all 
election personnel, from State and County Election Board Secretaries and staff to local 
precinct officials. The State Election Board owns and maintains the hardware and 
software which runs the system and the State maintains all equipment. The system 
manages election set-up, specifies the number of ballots needed, creates ballot styles, 
coordinates precinct and county compilation and reporting, and maintains election 
accounting. 
... The Oklahoma Election Management System operates on a legacy system, the DEC 
VAX 4300. Software is written in Powerhouse, a fourth generation language, and the 
Optical Scan devices being used are Optech Eagles 3 PE. The devices have proven to be 
remarkably well-built, with relatively minimal device failures being occurring [sic]. 
... Oklahoma voters have indicated they have a great deal of confidence in our system. 
Candidates for office and our local press when investigating the reported results of an 
election are not normally interested in a machine recount; the request is normally to 
recount the paper ballots because most believe, it is the best evidence of the voter’s 
intent. Paper ballots are retained for two years so the voters have confidence in the 
integrity of our elections.114 
In 2004, the author spoke with Mr. Clingman about voting systems. He described the Oklahoma 
system even more simply. He said: 
We bought the optical scanners and kicked the vendor out of the state. 
It is notable that — in contrast to the multitude of problems in states that have allowed vendors 
to undermine their elections — Oklahoma has reported virtually no election problems in the 
years since HAVA:  
♦ In the five years during which VotersUnite has been tracking media reports of election 
problems across the country, not one report has been obtained from Oklahoma.115   
♦ In 2004, the Election Incident Reporting System (EIRS) tracked 75 calls from Oklahoma. Ten 
calls were from citizens who said the machine in the precinct was broken and they were 
putting ballots directly into a ballot box. The other 65 were questions about polling places, 
absentee ballots, and registration.116   
                                                     
114 Written Testimony of Michael Clingman, Secretary, Oklahoma State Election Board. June 3, 2004. 
http://www.eac.gov/News/meetings/060304/pres5-060304 
115 http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp?sort=date&selectstate=OK 
116 http://voteprotect.org/index.php?display=EIRMapState&tab=ALL&state=Oklahoma 
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♦ In 2006, not one of the 1022 election day malfunctions reported to VotersUnite by the EIRS, 
Voter Action Hotline, and Pollworkers for Democracy was from Oklahoma.117  
 
By taking responsibility for, and full 
control of, the elections in Oklahoma, 
the State Board of Elections has 
prevented the vendor undermining 
that threatens the election structure 
in every other state. 
 
 
                                                     
117 E-Voting Failures in the 2006 Mid-Term Elections. January 2007. by VotersUnite.Org, VoteTrustUSA, Voter 
Action, and Pollworkers for Democracy. http://www.votersunite.org/info/E-VotingIn2006Mid-Term.pdf.  
Detailed data:  http://www.votersunite.org/info/2006E-VotingReports.xls 
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Case Study of Curry County, New Mexico. 
In the midst of vendor dependence facilitated by federal law and state decisions, the 
elections office maintains a contingency plan: counting the paper ballots by hand.  
In 2006, the New Mexico State Legislature passed a bill requiring all ballots to be cast on paper. 
Before then, 23 of the 33 counties in the state were using some type of electronic voting system. 
In order to comply with state law, those 23 counties had to replace their electronic machines. In 
order to comply with the Help America Vote Act of 2002, all the counties had to enhance their 
systems with some voting method that was accessible to voters with disabilities.  
Since a state overhaul was required, state officials decided to purchase the same system 
statewide for all the counties: ES&S M100 optical scanners to tabulate paper ballots and 
AutoMark ballot-marking devices for people with disabilities. In October of 2006, the machines 
were delivered to Curry County, and the other New Mexico counties, for use in the November 
election.  
In a July 23, 2008 interview with Coni Jo Lyman, Deputy Clerk of Curry County, the author 
learned what happened next — from the perspective of one of the people on the ground who 
has the responsibility to administer elections.  
When the state purchased the equipment, the one-year warranty was equivalent to the ES&S’ 
“Gold Plan,” which promises full coverage for the machines, software, and support for all the 
counties. But, according to Ms. Lyman, the promise wasn’t fulfilled. She said that during the 
first year, ES&S didn’t fix even one broken machine — and there were quite a few sitting in the 
warehouse waiting for repairs. Further, she said they “held parts in hostage,” refusing to send 
them to the counties so they could do their own repairs. Mr. Lyman told the author: 
ES&S has New Mexico over a barrel. They won’t fix the machines; they won’t train us 
to fix them; and they say if we open the hood the warranty is nullified.  
Don Francisco Trujillo, New Mexico’s Deputy Secretary of State sees the situation somewhat 
differently. In a July 24, 2008 interview with the author, Mr. Trujillo said that ES&S did fulfill on 
their first year warranty, though delivery of some parts needed for repairs was delayed because 
ES&S had them on back order. Mr. Trujillo said that just before the warranty expired in October 
2007, technicians inspected every piece of ES&S equipment across the state. Automated Election 
Services (AES),118 the ES&S contractor for New Mexico, made all the necessary repairs.  
Ms. Lyman, however, said that the inspection may not have included every machine. One of 
Curry County’s AutoMarks failed the 2006 testing and was taken to AES for repairs. Only in 
July 2008 did the county finally receive a replacement for it.  
Once the warranty expired, ES&S offered the counties two maintenance and support plans. 
Coverage for a year, negotiated between the state purchasing department and ES&S, would cost 
the counties a total of $1,106,000 for both contracts: 
1) $306,000 for software and firmware support. Mr. Trujillo said that the state agreed to pay 
for the first nine months of the software and firmware support, effective May 1, 2008. After 
that the counties will be encouraged to pay their share. This support includes “patches” to 
software or firmware written by ES&S, if flaws are found. (Contrast this policy with 
MicroSoft, which periodically sends out free patches to millions of Windows customers.)  
The support also includes telephone consultation with ES&S and AES.  
                                                     
118 http://www.electionpeople.com/aes.aspx 
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But Ms. Lyman has found ES&S’ telephone assistance less than satisfactory. She said: 
The call is answered by a Tier 1 person, who transfers you to a Tier 2 person who hears 
that you have a problem and transfers you to a Tier 3 person, who writes up a trouble 
ticket. And by the time you get to talk to somebody who might know the software 
you’re having a problem with, you’re so angry you’re ready to hang up. 
Ms. Lyman said they find the software support from AES to be much more satisfactory. In 
the July 3, 2008 election, the Election Reporting Manager (ERM) incorrectly tabulated the 
votes it read from the memory cards. According to Curry County Election Coordinator 
Stephanie Boydstun, as they fed the precinct and absentee totals into the card reader, the 
totals kept increasing until they were “bigger than the number of eligible voters.”  
To solve the problem, instead of using the ERM system to read the memory cards, county 
officials manually entered the results on the printouts from the individual scanners. A 
technician from AES took the computer back to the company for evaluation and discovered 
that some files were corrupted or missing, so AES re-installed the ERM system on the 
computer.  
Since the county was covered by the new ES&S software agreement, Ms. Lyman could have 
called ES&S telephone support. But she explained why she wouldn’t do that: 
If we have a real problem, there’s little point in calling “1-800-who-gives-a-crap.” 
According to Mr. Trujillo, there is a more important reason for purchasing ES&S software 
and firmware support. If some jurisdiction outside New Mexico pays ES&S to develop a 
firmware upgrade, or if ES&S develops one on their own initiative, ES&S will provide the 
upgrade free to covered counties.  
However, regardless of coverage, ES&S includes the upgrade in all future sales of its 
equipment. So, if a county needs to purchase new equipment, it will contain the firmware 
upgrade. If the county hasn’t upgraded all its other equipment, the new model may not be 
compatible with the older models. When asked if a county could purchase a model with the 
older, compatible firmware, Mr. Trujillo said they could not. ES&S sells only its latest 
version. If the upgrade is not compatible with the earlier version, an uncovered county 
would have to either purchase the upgrade for all its existing equipment or turn to another 
vendor. 
2) $800,000 for hardware maintenance and support, which includes labor and parts for 
repairing broken equipment.  
Mr. Trujillo said that only two counties, Lee and Sandoval, had purchased the hardware 
support agreement, and he has been negotiating with ES&S to allow local technicians to be 
trained to service the county’s equipment. Since only five AES technicians are certified by 
ES&S to repair equipment in New Mexico (352 miles wide by 391 miles long119), even if all 
the counties purchased the agreement, it would be logistically impossible for the five 
technicians to provide support to all the counties on election day.  
Prior to the state’s decision to use only ES&S equipment, local technicians were trained and 
available in every county. Mr. Trujillo said that arrangement worked well and that New 
Mexico law says vendors shall train local technicians to provide election day support. He 
said that ES&S was now reconsidering their previous refusal to do so. 
                                                     
119 http://www.city-data.com/states/New-Mexico-Location-size-and-extent.html 
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Curry County has other reasons for not purchasing hardware maintenance and support 
from ES&S. Ms. Lyman said that after receiving nothing for the original warranty, it made 
no sense to her county to spend approximately $30,000 to receive nothing for another year. 
She added that her county board never buys maintenance contracts for anything, even the 
copier. If something breaks, they get it repaired or buy a new one, and in the long term the 
county has saved a lot of money that way. So that’s their plan for the ES&S optical scanners 
and ballot-marking devices. 
However, ES&S policy of selling only its latest version of equipment could present Curry 
County with a dilemma if Curry County needs new equipment and ES&S is selling only an 
upgraded model:  
♦ New Mexico Statutes120 require that every county provide one voting system in each 
precinct. So, if one machine breaks and the county has no spare, Curry County would be 
legally bound to purchase a replacement. 
♦ The statutes also require that voting systems be approved by the Secretary of State. So, if 
the New Mexico Secretary of State declines to certify the new model, Curry County 
would not be legally allowed to purchase either the upgraded equipment or the upgrade 
for its older models.  
♦ The statutes also require that voting systems meet federal voting system standards. But 
the federal standards do not permit the use of different types of equipment that have not 
been tested and approved as an integrated system. So, unless ES&S chooses to have a 
system that includes both its older and its latest model tested to federal standards, Curry 
County could not purchase and use the newer model without upgrading all its 
equipment — even if the new model appeared to be compatible with the old one.  
♦ Furthermore, Curry County could not turn to another vendor unless it replaced all its 
equipment. 
But, while it appears that ES&S’ has Curry County (and other New Mexico counties) over a 
barrel, Ms. Lyman is confident in her county’s resourcefulness. She ended the interview with 
the author by explaining the source of that confidence:  
The only thing that gets us through these elections and the frustration of dealing with 
ES&S is the confidence that comes from knowing we have the paper ballots. No matter 
what happens — whether the equipment works or not, whether we have software 
problems or not — we have the paper ballots so we can always get the election results. 
If necessary, we can always hand count them.  
Ms. Lyman’s words demonstrate that the ability of the New Mexico counties to hold successful 
elections still rests in their own hands — if they accept the challenge. 
 
                                                     
120 1-9-5. A. “Requirement to purchase and use voting systems.” and 1-9-2. A “Secretary of state; manner of 
approval.” http://www.conwaygreene.com/nmsu/lpext.dll?f=templates&fn=main-h.htm&2.0 
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Case Study of Oregon 
For this state, necessity gave birth to invention.  
Oregon has developed its own, non-proprietary, citizen-owned method of providing 
accessibility for the state’s voters with disabilities.121 
Gene Newton, Oregon’s HAVA Program Officer, has managed the development of an 
innovative means of providing voting accessibility to people with disabilities who are unable, 
for whatever reason, to mark a printed ballot. The method is called the Alternate Format Ballot 
(AFB) and it’s used on standard computer stations along with standard assistive technology 
widely available for people with disabilities.  
Mr. Newton first proposed this solution in 2004 after a few brainstorming sessions with his 
wife, Angel Hale, who is blind. The state did a pilot project in 2005 and the whole concept 
became the solution of choice in 2006. 
“Nothing is proprietary,” Mr. Newton said. 
The state commissioned a consultant, accountable only to the state, to develop a Conversion 
Application that accepts as input the election definitions that counties already create for each 
election. The Conversion Application converts the election definition data to standard html 
files, thus creating an Alternate Format Ballot for every ballot style. An AFB can be opened in 
most web browsers, but the Internet itself is not in the picture - just the web browser used to 
read html files.  
The AFB itself only requires that a person have access to a computer, a web browser, and a 
printer. AFB is designed to work on any platform, such as a Mac or a PC. The computer station 
is basically a ballot-marking device.  
Voters with disabilities can vote at home. Voters who use assistive technology to access 
information on their home computers can use that technology to access the AFB at home. Such a 
voter is sent the html file for the correct ballot style, based on information in the voter 
registration database. The file can be sent to the voter via e mail or on CD or disc. The voter 
opens the ballot using a web browser and displays it on the computer screen.  
Describing the AFB to the author, Mr. Newton said:  
In response to the Help America Vote Act, the state needed a voting solution to allow 
people with disabilities to vote privately and independently in the same manner as 
other voters. Since Oregon is an all vote by mail state, this meant getting an accessible 
ballot to voters to allow them to vote at home. The Alternate Format Ballot became that 
solution. 
Or, voters can use one of their county’s accessible stations. Voters who do not have access to 
the needed technology can use one of the county’s accessible computer stations. Each county 
has, at minimum, one permanent desktop station and one portable station that can be taken to 
independent living centers, hospitals, or even a person’s home. The counties’ accessible 
computer stations use off-the-shelf software and are not networked or connected to the Internet.  
                                                     
121 This section is based wholly on the author’s interview with Mr. Newton. Additional information can be found 
here: http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/HAVA/accessibility.shtml 
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The state created a custom Overlay that is used with a special keypad, Intellikeys, as a voter 
interface. The stations also provide screen magnification, a screen reader, and assistive input 
devices — such as a switch interface, dual switches, trackball, and joystick — that help make the 
ballot accessible across a wide range of disabilities. The voter can also use a standard keyboard 
to vote the AFB.  
Reviewing the ballot is also fully accessible. After making selections, the voter can review the 
ballot on a separate review screen to check for errors prior to printing it. The AFB even allows a 
blind voter to verify the paper ballot. The printed ballot can be scanned into the computer, and 
using Optical Character Recognition software, the voter can have the ballot read back using a 
screen reader.  
Once completed and printed the ballot is cast using the secrecy envelope and signature 
verification envelope that each voter receives in the mail along with the printed ballot. County 
officials duplicate the AFB onto an optical scan ballot for tabulating, and the original ballot is 
maintained as the official record of the vote. 
The AFB has received excellent reviews from voters, many who expressed joy over being able to 
vote privately and independently for the first time in their life.  
Asked about the cost, Mr. Newton said the major cost was for the 96 computer stations for the 
county. Other costs included approximately $65,000 for developing the Conversion Application. 
“The overall costs for the stations and the development of the conversion application 
was less than half a million dollars” said Mr. Newton.  
And that’s it. No license fees, maintenance fees, support fees for counties to pay to voting 
system vendors. No dependence on vendors to provide accessibility for voters with disabilities.  
State-owned and operated, inexpensive and effective, Oregon’s system may inspire other states 
to follow suit. 
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Recommendations for Reversing the Direction in 2008 and Beyond 
By re-asserting ownership of elections, local officials and private citizens begin to rebuild 
the underpinnings of our election structure, even in time for the 2008 general election. 
How Local Election Officials Can Take Back Their Power 
Burdened by the demands of laws and the complexity of voting systems, local election officials 
nationwide have become increasingly dependent on their vendors for many phases of election 
administration. But local election officials in most states have the legal authority to take back 
much of the control of their own elections and share that responsibility with their constituents.  
In the long term, taking these actions — or even a selection of them — is likely to be less costly, 
both in money and in consequences, than relying on the services provided by the vendors.  
Recommendations for 2008 and beyond:  
Knowledge is power122 
♦ Demand complete and accurate documentation for all the products purchased.  
♦ Train the elections staff thoroughly on the equipment so the staff fully understands the 
operation of the hardware and software, can manage all the preventative maintenance, and 
can troubleshoot effectively.  
♦ Improve training for each subsequent election by providing a form for election workers to 
log problems, so you can identify recurring problems and develop solutions. 
Control pre-election testing 
♦ Train the elections staff, or hire an experienced IT person accountable to the jurisdiction, to 
design the ballots and generate the ballot definition files for each election.  
♦ Design and create the test decks of ballots for pre-election testing rather than having the 
vendor create them. Ideally, follow the guidelines published specifically for that purpose by 
John Washburn, a professional test engineer.123 Remember that the goal of testing is to find 
problems, so include complex test cases. Try to break the system by testing ballots outside 
the normal expectations.  
♦ Encourage the public to add ballots of their own design to the test decks. 
♦ Conduct pre-election tests on every machine and encourage public input to, and scrutiny of, 
the process in order to catch and correct as many problems as possible before election day. 
The more eyes and minds, the better, so encourage public participation to the extent allowed 
by law. Investigate every discrepancy and keep the public informed. 
♦ If complete testing on every machine is not possible, at least test that every machine boots 
up and counts votes correctly according to a less rigorous test that includes pressing every 
ballot position and button on every screen to ensure that it works correctly.  
                                                     
122 See also: You Go to Elections with the Voting System You Have: Stop-Gap Mitigations for Deployed Voting 
Systems. 2008. J. Alex Halderman, Hovav Shacham, Eric Rescorla, and David Wagner. 
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/stopgap-evt08.pdf 
123 Guidelines for Creating a Deck of Test Ballots. By John Washburn, Certified Software Quality Engineer. Sept. 8, 
2006. http://www.washburnresearch.org/archive/TestingGuidelines/GuidelinesForCreatingTestBallots.pdf 
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Control ballot printing and absentee ballots 
♦ If possible, contract with a vendor-independent printer to print ballots, and monitor the 
number of ballots printed and delivered. Better yet, if possible, print the ballots in-house. 
♦ Use workers in the jurisdiction to prepare absentee ballot envelopes for mailing, rather than 
using a vendor you cannot oversee. Better yet, if possible, prepare them in-house. 
♦ If the office uses automated signature comparison software for returned absentee ballot 
envelopes, set the software to the most sensitive level so that the staff’s eyes can check all 
potential discrepancies.  
Oversee election day administration 
♦ Train poll workers thoroughly on equipment operation and troubleshooting procedures in 
order to reduce the need for vendor technicians at the polling places. If necessary, hire a 
training specialist to assist.  
♦ Establish a well-staffed, private hotline for poll workers directly into the elections office, not 
a direct line to the vendor technicians. Provide a form to log each call to the hotline to help 
you identify recurring problems, so you can develop solutions for future elections.  
♦ Provide emergency paper ballots (regular, not provisional) in all precincts where e-voting 
machines are used.  
♦ Remove any malfunctioning machine from service for the rest of the day. Educate poll 
workers on how to manage malfunctioning machines. 
♦ Train the elections staff thoroughly on the operation of the system, so they can retrieve 
results and run every kind of report, including audit logs and troubleshooting reports, 
without intervention from the vendor. If necessary, hire an experienced, independent IT 
person accountable to the election office. Oversee that technician as carefully as you oversee 
vendor technicians (see below).  
Oversee the performance of the vendor’s products 
♦ Make it easy for citizens to double-check their registration status before the election by 
advertising Internet pages, phone numbers, and other methods they can use. Encourage 
them to report errors to the election office and the Secretary of State. 
♦ Insist that poll workers print and post all precinct results at the precinct. Compare the 
results printed at each precinct with the results reported for that precinct by the central 
tabulating system. Investigate every discrepancy and enter a written note into the record to 
explain each one.  
♦ If the jurisdiction uses digital scanning technology, turn the “autoresolve” feature off, so the 
staff’s eyes can resolve all damaged ballot images. 
♦ Compare the number of voters signed in at each precinct to the number of ballots cast. 
Investigate every discrepancy and enter a written note into the record to explain each one.  
♦ Immediately after each election, conduct public hand counts of as many ballots as the law 
allows. Compare the results with results reported by the software. Investigate every 
discrepancy and enter a written note into the record to explain each one. 
♦ Establish and use an effective method of analyzing results for anomalies. If necessary, hire a 
demographer and/or statistician to help set up the method and train the staff on using it.  
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♦ Print and study the audit logs from the central tabulator to detect anomalies, track 
problems, and prevent future problems. 
♦ Print the audit log for each machine that fails to perform as expected (can’t generate a zero 
tape, won’t open, won’t close, jams, etc.). Study the audit logs to help you detect anomalies, 
track problems, and prevent future problems. These logs also provide documentation to 
support the problem diagnosis and explain and prove it to others if need be. 
♦ Develop comprehensive, detailed checklists for problem reports. Ensure that all staff and 
poll workers use them.  
♦ Log and investigate all equipment and software problems that occur in the field, during 
transmission of vote data, or in the central office. Attempt to replicate the problem on the 
same machine when possible. If vendors offer explanations, remember that their company 
loyalties may make them reluctant to admit to flaws in their products. 
♦ Send formal reports of confirmed problems to the Election Assistance Commission.  
Oversee vendor employees who perform services 
♦ Insist that at least one staff member be present at all times when a vendor technician is 
working on hardware or software. Insist that the technician explain all actions and 
procedures to the staff as they are being done. Make sure the staff runs and examines the 
event log report before the technician leaves.  
♦ Insist on credentials and references for all vendor technicians who provide support or 
service to the jurisdiction, including the extent of training, the length of time working for the 
vendor, and credible references pertaining to the work the technician is doing. Check 
references. If the technician appears to be less competent or ethical than expected, demand 
someone else. 
♦ If a vendor services a machine, track the technician’s name and ID with the machine serial 
number. Require the technician to print the event log audit report for that machine, so you 
can inspect and track additional information about the functioning of the machine, what 
time relevant events occurred, and explain to others if need be. 
♦ Insist that at least one staff member accompany any equipment (including memory cards) 
sent to a vendor’s location for analysis and remain with the machine as long as it is there.  
♦ Educate staff and poll workers to recognize authentic badges, uniforms, or other credentials 
of vendors, what to do if they question a vendor’s ID, and what vendors are and are not 
allowed to do.  
Recommendations for gaining even more oversight capabilities in the future: 
♦ Renegotiate contracts, if possible, and vigorously enforce them. Pursue legal action against 
vendors who violate laws or ethics. 
♦ Lobby legislators and/or state election officials. Convince them to: 
- Require a new election when equipment flaws cause suspect outcomes.  
- Allow increased citizen observation of election administration activities. 
- Mandate significant hand counted spot-checks of the software’s performance. 
- Add a “no choice” option for each contest on the ballot, especially electronic ballots, to 
eliminate questions about excessive undervotes.  
♦ Lobby to ban the use of equipment whose operation and accuracy the elections office and 
the public cannot oversee.  
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In a democracy, silence implies consent. As is true of local election officials, there are actions 
that ordinary citizens could take to increase our oversight of our own elections and thus reduce, 
or at least mitigate, the vendor undermining of elections. What you learn from taking one or 
more of these actions is likely to guide you as you decide what additional actions to take.  
Recommendations for 2008, and then beyond:  
Essential first steps 
♦ Accept responsibility for the health of democracy. Elections are your opportunity to have a 
voice in your government. Refuse to sit quietly while vendors undermine your voice.  
♦ Inform your friends and family about vendor undermining and its dangers.  
♦ Establish a relationship with your local election administrator, based on your mutual 
interest in accurate elections. Learn about the administration of elections in your jurisdiction 
and the extent to which vendors have undermined elections in your jurisdiction. 
♦ Print this document and give it to your local election administrator.  
Exercise oversight to the extent allowed by law 
♦ Oversee through observation. Observe as many parts of the election process as you can, for 
example: ballot programming, ballot printing, preparation for pre-election testing, pre-
election testing itself, election day at the precinct, closing the polls at your precinct, the 
totals printed at your precinct, the process of opening absentee ballots, the election night 
tally at the central office, the opening of the provisional ballots, the canvassing of the ballots. 
For more information, ideas, and guidance, see Black Box Voting’s Toolkit 2008. 124 
♦ Serve as a paid poll worker. Serving in your precinct on election day allows you not only to 
observe, but also to ensure that the proper procedures are followed and that vendors do not 
have unauthorized access to equipment that may malfunction. Most jurisdictions are in 
need of poll workers and will welcome your offer. Contact your local election office or 
contact Pollworkers for Democracy125 for more information.  
♦ Learn how to observe and what to watch for.  
Recommendations for gaining even more oversight capabilities in the future: 
♦ Lobby legislators and/or state election officials. Convince them, hopefully in coordination 
with your local election official, to: 
- Require a new election when equipment flaws cause suspect outcomes.  
- Allow increased citizen observation of election administration activities. 
- Mandate significant hand counted spot-checks of the software’s performance. 
- Add a “no choice” option for each contest on the ballot, especially electronic ballots, to 
eliminate questions about excessive undervotes.  
♦ Lobby to ban the use of equipment whose operation and accuracy the elections office and 
the public cannot oversee.  
                                                     
124 Top Five Things You Can Do To Protect Election 2008.  Black Box Voting. 
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/toolkit2008.pdf 
125 http://act.credoaction.com/pollworkers/faq.html 
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Conclusion 
While our elections are still in jeopardy from the age-old threats of voter registration errors, 
polling place problems, vote coercion, vote-buying, and the corruption of election officials and 
partisans, in 2008 we are also confronted with a more recent, high-tech danger. The very 
structure of our elections is threatened by the country’s pervasive dependence on the goods and 
services of a handful of voting system vendors.  
The depth of the current dependence is shocking, but even more shocking is the fact that our 
elections are dependent on vendors whose records reveal their unethical and even unlawful 
behavior, as well as their incompetence.  
But it is within our power to reclaim control of our own elections. The first step is to understand 
the danger of depending on vendors to administer elections, and then exercise the power we 
have to provide a solid, citizen-controlled foundation for our election structure.  
Even in time for the November 2008 election, election officials and private citizens can take 
action (see page 48) to oversee the vendors and limit their control. In 2008 and beyond, citizens 
can and must re-assert their ownership of elections and demand transparent citizen oversight of 
the elections they rightfully own.  
